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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
QUARTERLY REPORT NO. 13
Ames Research Center
and
Aviation Safety Reporting System Office*
SUMMARY
ASRS.Quarterly Report No. 13 presents a selection of aviation safety reports that relate to loss
of control in flight, problems that occur as a result of similar sounding alphanumerics, and pilot
incapacitation. A separate research study, which deals with problems related to the go-around
maneuver in air carrier operations, is also included. The Alert Bulletin section contains a sampling
of bulletins (and FAA responses to them) that pertain to air traffic control systems and procedures.
INTRODUCTION
This is the thirteenth in a series of reports based on safety-related incidents submitted in narra-
tive form to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by pilots and controllers
(refs. 1-12). ASRS operates under a memorandum of agreement between the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The report contains a detailed study of air carrier aircraft go-around maneuvers, derived from
the ASRS data base. The study is preceded by a selection of reports dealing with aircraft loss-of-
control incidents, problems associated with similar sounding names and numbers as used in flight
operations, and pilot incapacitation situations. A concluding section presents a number of Alert
Bulletins issued by ASRS, and the FAA responses they have elicited.
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTS
As customary, this report includes a selection of report narratives, submitted by pilots and
controllers, that are illustrative of specific safety topics. One study of instances in which aircraft
control has been lost in flight, another that deals with problems arising from confusion of similar-
sounding names and numbers, and a third on pilot incapacitation are discussed.
*Battelle's Columbus Division, Mountain View, California 94043.
Loss of Control in Flight
During the 25 months between May, 1978 and June 1980, ASRS received 22 reports of loss of
aircraft control in flight. Though half of these involved small aircraft (less than 5,000 Ib TOGW),
several aircraft categories, including wide-body transports, were represented (table 1). Half of the
incidents occurred during approach and landing (table 2). The occurrences were attributed to wake
turbulence in about half the cases and to pilot technique in about one-quarter of the cases (table 3).
TABLE 1.-TYPES OF AIRCRAFT
' Type
Small aircraft, <5, 000 Ib
Small transport, 5,000-14,500 Ib
Large transport, 150,000-300,000 Ib
Heavy transport, >300,000 Ib








































The seriousness of the occurrences varied from "controllability was momentarily in doubt" to
severe loss of control with imminent hazard to the aircraft and its occupants. Examples of each are
summarized here. The first was received from the pilot of a small aircraft, landing out of instrument
meteorological conditions.
1. Aircraft B, a prop jet, was doing a full-power or near full-power runup on a
heading of about 270° west of and adjacent to the touchdown zone of runway 36.1
was completing an ILS approach when I encountered significant turbulence behind
aircraft B, to the extent that full control of my aircraft was momentarily in doubt.
The air was very smooth except behind aircraft B . . . .
* * *
This report came from the pilot of a wide-body aircraft.
2. While on final approach to runway 28R, an aircraft was cleared for takeoff
same runway ... at about 600 ft another aircraft (large transport, less than
300,000 Ib) was also cleared for takeoff ... at this point I alerted my crew for a
possible go-around. At 200-300 ft, I realized a go-around would compound the
problem . . . due to the straight-ahead procedure and overtaking departure aircraft. I
was all but committed to a landing. With the wind 290° at 12 knots, I increased
approach and threshold speed slightly above normal for impending wake turbulence.
Below 20 ft, I had a handful of airplane that required additional thrust for adequate
control. The lateral displacement was very rapid and heavy . .. although landing was
smooth, it was 500 ft beyond the normal touchdown point because of lift produced
by wake turbulence. The other aircraft rotated as I was flaring. I commented to the
controller that it was "Very tight." His reply: "It was legal." I was later told (by the
tower chief), "Minimum separation for landing/departing traffic is 6,000 ft, and we
had it." After what I felt at flare in a wide-body, I strongly suggest the separation be
increased, especially where one's prerogative has been taken away by local proce-
dures . . . . I will never permit myself to be placed in a position like this again . . . .
A much more serious occurrence was reported by the crew of a small piston-engine transport
aircraft (this extract contains material from two reports).
3. During scheduled commuter operation from ABC to XYZ, wake turbulence
was encountered on the ILS course. Flight 123 was turned on the localizer 2-3 miles
from the final approach fix, given approach clearance and told to contact tower . . .
While tracking the localizer inbound severe wake turbulence was encountered caus-
ing the aircraft to become completely inverted. Corrective action was taken and the
plane rolled upright . . . . We immediately flew to the left of the localizer . . . and
advised the tower of our action. We then broke out of the clouds and saw heavy-
transport aircraft B ahead approximately 2-1/2-3 miles. He was at or above our alti-
tude [and] eventually executed a missed approach. This occurrence could have been
prevented had we known about the type traffic ahead and his distance ... it was
fortunate that the incident occurred at altitude and not near the surface . . . .
In several cases, a loss of control was pilot-induced, though this occurred for a variety of
reasons. The following are examples of this category.
4. I allowed a newspaper photographer to install a camera and camera mount
on the top wing of my homebuilt aircraft. The purpose of this operation was to
gather in-flight photos. Shortly after takeoff ... I noted some burbling and direc-
tional instability that had not been present on previous flights. Since the thing was
inaccessible in flight, I was obligated to eventually land with it in place. It then
seemed the prudent thing to do was climb to altitude and make a controllability
check. This aircraft was never too gentle in the stall, and with the camera in place it
rolled inverted at the first nibble, there being a distinct lack of rudder authority.
Upon recovery and after collecting my thoughts, I realized that I had forgotten to
note the speed at which the roll occurred. Since this value was essential to a success-
ful landing, I repeated the procedure, this time with the camera turned on. The
result was the same; I noted the speed, got some spectacular pictures, and learned to
never again allow such a device on my aircraft.
5. I was heading 285° when notified by ABC approach of an unknown aircraft.
Looking to right I spotted a black high-wing aircraft finishing a loop . . . the aircraft
went again into a loop and evidently lost control at the top, because when he came
out he was facing me. I turned right and descended. While trying to pull the plane
out of this attitude, I stalled and spun. Upon recovery I called Approach, and was
vectored to an airport. Damage was a broken windshield.
6. IFR on top broken layer and VFR conditions below. After departure I lost
vacuum pump. Continued on top with VFR below. Entered tops without gyros and
flew on needle-ball and airspeed. Entered turbulence and lost 3,000 ft then climbed
2,000 and unable to follow instruments because of turbulence. I had informed each
controller that I had no gyros ... in rain and turbulence and rolled over and also
exceeded red-line speed by 40 mph. Finally made ground contact and saw I was
inverted. Rolled out straight and level at red-line plus 30 and requested a no-gyro
approach in haze with 3-5 miles visibility. Landed at ABC — where aircraft is to be
inspected for damage.
Pilot-induced loss of control was not limited to small or general aviation aircraft.
7. Over the end of the runway the aircraft started to settle rapidly. The first
officer applied power; however, the aircraft struck the runway sharply. The aircraft
was left-wing low. I grabbed the controls and kept the aircraft level and on the run-
way until it was no longer possible. The aircraft slid off the runway and stopped.
The left main gear broke off on impact or very soon thereafter.
8. Number 3 generator went off the line and engineer called my attention to
problem. First officer told me autopilot had kicked off. Aircraft was descending
slowly and lost about 400 ft. I took control and stopped descent for a few seconds,
[then] put autopilot back on. Aircraft pitched up abruptly to 30°-40° pitch and
fully stalled. I recovered but lost 2,400 ft. Informed Center of problem and climbed
back to 35,000 ft. Checked all systems and everything worked normally . . . aircraft
stabilizer trim was at 10° aircraft nose-up when I started recovery after taking auto-
pilot off. I have no explanation of how or why this incident occurred.
Some occurrences were difficult to categorize, as in the following case.
9. I was cleared for a low approach and encountered some form of wake tur-
bulence . . . near the departure end of the runway I ... began a climb on runway
heading as noise abatement dictates no turns until 1,000 ft. Shortly after raising the
nose . . . the aircraft rolled sharply to the left. As the wings passed through the verti-
cal I glanced at the airspeed indicator which read 140 knots. At that point I com-
pleted the roll at about 1,000 ft. I received word that (FAA) was investigating the
incident. I went voluntarily to explain my action . . . they advised me that a ...
violation would follow for conducting acrobatic flight in a control zone . . . .
Other reports provided considerable detail as to the exact cause of the problem.
10. Aircraft (a small transport) was returning from a training flight; instructor
and two F/O trainees on board. Weather briefings indicated squall line activity in the
area, but (we encountered) no significant turbulence until midpoint on the ILS. Pre-
vious aircraft had reported "moderate or possibly severe" wind shear on final . . .
20-mile downwind leg, intercepted glide slope at 2,800 ft, in and out of clouds,
strong south wind requiring a 20° correction to the left. (At) approximately 1,600 ft
MSL (600 AGL), strong updraft and north wind which pushed us south of centerline
and off top of glide slope. With power at idle, airspeed increasing from 140 to
160 KIAS, nose slightly down, rate of climb [was] 700 FPM. Weather was very tur-
bulent, control difficult, heavy rain, very dark. PIC attempted to keep from climbing
further by maintaining idle power and forward controls. Downdraft encountered
while in this condition. As aircraft went through 1,400-1,500 ft MSL F/O called
3,500 FPM rate of descent. PIC added full power, recovered above the trees just out-
side the airport boundary and slightly south of centerline. Altimeter read less than
100-ft AGL at bottom-out. Subsequent ILS and landing uneventful as cell moved
northeast . . . .
11. We were on final approach for runway 34R (in a large transport aircraft)
when we encountered wake turbulence at 200 ft AGL of such magnitude that
momentary control of the aircraft was lost. Full power was applied instantly and
recovery was made at approximately 50 ft AGL. We had made a stabilized 30° flap
approach 5 miles in-trail of a wide-body cargo aircraft . . . . The unusual factor was
that aircraft B flew an approach profile approximately 1,000 ft above the glide
slope and initiated a go-around 800 ft above the approach end of the runway . . . the
air was perfectly smooth until about 200 ft AGL when we were struck by a violent
downdraft. In my opinion the aircraft actually quit flying . . . there was no stick
shaker . . . upon recovery the aircraft was aligned with the runway and a normal
landing was accomplished . . . .
12. Departure and weather attached. After-incident conclusion: aircraft flew
into water-spout cell like going over waterfall in a canoe. [This was] an overwater
flight that encountered turbulence and possibly a water spout during IMC flight over
ocean. Instrument failure, some aircraft damage and loss of aircraft control occurred
with uncontrolled dive until VMC below clouds where enough altitude existed to
regain control.
Similar Sounding Alphanumerics
The diagnostic term "similar sounding A/N" is regularly applied to reports submitted to ASRS
during their processing if their content indicates that a safety-related incident has involved mis-
understanding arising from names or numbers that have been confused with other names or num-
bers. Using the term, retrieval of such reports from the ASRS data base is facilitated; opportunities
for such misunderstandings are almost limitless, and it is obvious that they present a serious — and
difficult-to-eradicate — hazard to safety of flight. Perhaps the most frequent example of this form
of confusion occurs when one air carrier flight number is mistaken by a controller for another, or
the corollary to this — when a flightcrew acts upon a clearance or instruction meant for another.
Other manifestations of the problem involve runway numbers ("runway two zero" mistaken for
"runway two"), altitudes (six thousand instead of one six thousand), vector headings mistaken for
altitudes (heading 310° instead of flight level 310), and geographic names that sound like others
when heard through headphones or radio speakers. The basic problem is often compounded by the
read-back problem previously discussed in these quarterly reports (ref. 12).
The first two narratives in the following selection illustrate the heading/altitude problem
graphically. In the first, the flightcrew, maintaining FL280, was expecting a climb and a vector to
accord with the original plan. The second, from a controller, describes a not-untypical conflict from
this sort of error.
1. Center cleared our aircraft to heading 310 for direct to fix. The first officer
is new and was expecting the filed altitude of FL310. He initiated the climb. I called
Center to verify a heading versus an altitude change. Center verified the heading and
cleared the aircraft to FL310.
2. Aircraft A cleared to descend to FL280. Aircraft B cleared to climb to
FL270. Aircraft A issued a heading of 240°. Pilot acknowledged with "Roger,
240" and took it as an altitude change instead of a heading. He descended through
aircraft B's altitude. Neither aircraft took evasive action. Altitude was observed at
27,200. I questioned the pilot; he said I cleared him to FL240 and that he had
acknowledged it. A full read-back by the pilot would have prevented the incident as
his misunderstanding would have been noticed prior to descending below FL280.
Despite the potential for conflict implicit in the next report, it is reminiscent of a theatrical
comic routine.
3. Flight A was an international nonstop under Center radar control in CAVU
weather. The first officer was controlling the aircraft through the autopilot. Center's
high-altitude sector issued, as understood by the captain and first officer, the follow-
ing clearance: "Cleared to descend to two zero zero, cross two zero miles south of
XXX at two two zero." Captain read back the clearance and first officer selected
20,000 on the altitude selector indicator. Flight was subsequently changed over to
the next center. Initial contact from the flight to the center was: "Flight A leaving
two two zero for two zero zero." The center's first response was: "Were you cleared
to two zero zero?", or words to that effect. We advised that this was what the flight-
crew had understood. Some time later Center told us that the previous center had
advised that the clearance was only to FL220. At no time was the flight advised to
maintain 220, which could have been accomplished easily, as the flight was in a
rather shallow descent. Remainder of descent and landing was normal and unevent-
ful. Misunderstanding — if in fact there was one — was probably precipitated by the
use of too many "alike-sounding" numbers, given at one time. ATC sectors could be
restructured so that the possibility of confusing numbers would be eliminated. When
the second center received the transmission from the flight, which indicated a
descent below what the center had as assigned altitude, it should have issued an
immediate clearance for the flight to maintain two two zero. Such an assignment
could have been accomplished immediately.
Names of geographic points or designated fixes that may (or may not) look quite different
when printed can sometimes sound nearly alike when pronounced or heard on aviation radio equip-
ment. Two narratives here show this trap.
4. On an instrument training flight, Approach Control asked us to give an esti-
mate to WRAPS intersection. Before the student could work out the estimate,
Approach gave us the following clearance: "Trainer Aircraft is cleared to the
Modesto Airport via Victor 23 Grange, direct RAMPS (the Modesto outer marker),
maintain 3,000 ft." Needless to say, the student mistook RAMPS for WRAPS and
became thoroughly confused over the clearance.
5. A17 has two checkpoints: RESIN and AYSON. These two fixes are some-
times confused over the radio due to the pronunciation similarity.
An ASRS Alert Bulletin was issued to point out the RESIN-AYSON difficulty with the
encouraging result that AYSON was changed to INDEE within a very short time. Of interest in the
second of the similar-fix reports is the fact that RAMPS appears only on the instrument approach
chart, while WRAPS appears only on the en route chart for the area. The student's confusion seems
natural. Fix misidentification has appeared in Morse code form as well as in words.
6. I was cleared for an NDB runway 32 approach at Muncie. I tuned and
retuned the SELLA LOM and had a positive audio identification on it. The ADF
in the aircraft was the tunable type, not the type where you set the numbers in a
window. The ADF indicated that I was well to the right of course. I turned approxi-
mately 50° to the left, to which the ADF responded. After intercepting the inbound
course, I heard the marker beacon (which I used as a final check) and commenced
the approach. After breaking out and the approach time had elapsed, I saw the air-
port at 10:30, 3 miles away. I was incredulous at being so far off. Arriving at the
airport, I noticed the runway was "30," not "32." I executed the missed approach,
informed ATC of my problem, and was cleared for another approach (a VOR run-
way 32) into Muncie and landed without further incident. The problem was that I
had misidentified the station (SELLA NDB). Instead, I was receiving VIDEO LOM
at Anderson. The frequency difference is 6 MHz and the identifiers couldn't be
closer: VIDEO is (. -. .); SELLA is (- -. .). With a tuning-type ADF the visual indica-
tion of station frequency is nil for reliability. I would have sworn that I heard
SELLA but I did not. I flew the Muncie approach with the Anderson LOM.
The most frequently cited subdivision of the similar-sounding A/N category involves the
transposition of an aircraft flight number or call sign to another aircraft. One flightcrew accepts
another's clearance, or a controller gives an instruction meant for one aircraft to another. A short
classic example leads off this group, followed by others typical of the type.
7. Aircraft A and aircraft B had similar call signs. Aircraft A took a clearance
meant for B and reached B's altitude before B left same, descending as cleared.
8. Two of the same make of aircraft with the last three tail numbers similar
were on radar vectors making an approach to runway 30. For several minutes vectors
were being given without the controller or either aircraft being aware that another
aircraft with the same three digit designation was on the same frequency. My own
aircraft ended up well out to sea, having been on vectors that made little sense as
part of the approach. Because of the heavy cloud cover and traffic, I assumed that
the vectors were for separation and/or sequencing. I became aware that I was on a
heading well away from the airport and at an increasing distance from it. At about
the same time I began to question the vectors, the controller realized that there
were, in fact, two aircraft with the same call signs under his control. At that point
the problem was resolved, with each aircraft giving its full number . . . . Though my
experience resulted only in inconvenience and some confusion, I am sufficiently
concerned about the possibility of being in hard IFR with another aircraft of similar
call sign that I have requested a change of my "N" number to one that I think is
unlikely to be duplicated. Had'my experience taken place at a low altitude or had I
been in an area with mountains surrounding the field, serious difficulties could well
have followed.
9. While we were calling in range on Company frequency, I thought I under-
stood Center to clear us down to 4,000 ft so I started down. After the other pilot
finished talking to Company he asked what altitude we were cleared to and I said
4,000. He said he hadn't heard it because of the transmission from Company so we
checked if the descent was for us. The controller said no, that it was for another
aircraft at 6,000 ft that apparently had an ending call sign like ours. We had
descended about 400 ft and asked if we should go back to 6,000. The controller
said 5,000 would be fine. A normal approach and landing followed.
10. Received a call from Center advising that our 9,000-ft altitude would not
be sufficient after fix, which we were aware of. They asked if we would like 11,000
or 13,000. We acknowledged that we would take 11,000. Controller said, I believe,
"Aircraft ABC cleared to 11,000." We in turn replied, "Aircraft ABC is out of
9,000 for 11,000." Another aircraft, CBA, at the same time received a climb to
13,000. When I was at 10,200 Center called and asked if I was climbing. I replied
that I was and Center said that he had not given me climb clearance. I replied that I
thought that I had received it and that I had told him at least twice that I was climb-
ing. I even discussed the situation with my copilot and we were in agreement. Con-
troller did say no problem was caused, that we could continue to 11,000. Possibly
the nearness of these two "N" numbers caused either me or the controller some con-
fusion. I personally will be more diligent in the future.
11. Aircraft A was climbing to 11,000. Five miles behind aircraft A was air-
craft B with similar identification at 12,000 and overtaking aircraft A. Aircraft B
was issued climb to 17,000; aircraft A acknowledged for aircraft B and began to
climb. Aircraft A was again told to maintain 11,000; his altitude readout at this
time showed 11,700. Aircraft B saw aircraft A and advised that traffic was no factor.
He climbed to 17,000. Subsequently aircraft A was climbed to FL190 and commun-
ications were transferred.
12. Upon arrival at departure end of runway 25R I heard Tower say, "Air-
craft A, cross 25R, position and hold on 25L." Our flight was aircraft B. We then
heard aircraft A receive takeoff clearance. Next transmission to us (I believe) was to
"cross 25R, position and hold 25L." As we were taking position on 25L we heard
another aircraft cleared to cross 25R and hold short of 25L. After about a 20-sec
delay on the runway we heard Tower tell aircraft C to go around. We were then told
by the tower, "You were advised to hold short of 25L." We stated that we under-
stood we had been cleared on to 25L. Tower stated that we had read back air-
craft A's clearance. Trip continued. Contributing factors: similar airline flight num-
bers, arrivals and departures on closely related parallel runways, misinterpretation of
radio clearance, amount of traffic.
As with all other aspects of aviation, only constant attention to details — eternal vigilance
can overcome the traps in waiting. With the least complacency can come a new problem.
13. A flight of four fighters split up for recoveries for a PAR final. Copeck 2
departed the range first, followed 3 miles in trail by Copeck 1. Copeck 2 contacted
Approach at 10,000 ft MSL and was given a heading of 070° and then 060°.
Copeck 1 was given the same vectors. Copeck 2 was descended to 7,000 ft and the
pilot observed the city airport passing off his right wing. The pilot started a right
turn and Approach advised him to maintain heading 060. Copeck 2 replied, "Nega-
tive" and continued a right turn to 140°. Mountains rise abruptly to over 9,000 ft
just 6 miles east of the extended PAR final approach course. In the meantime,
Approach had given Copeck 1 turns to 120° and 160°. The controller issued these
vectors believing the first aircraft was Copeck 1. After Copeck 2 refused the turns,
the controller realized he had been giving vectors to the wrong aircraft. He reidenti-
fied the aircraft and issued new vectors and altitudes. Conclusion: Copeck 1 and
Copeck 2 were misidentified by one sector controller during handoff to another
sector. Instructions issued to Copeck 2 left him on a collision course with the moun-
tains east of the final approach course.
14. When I got the handoff off on the aircraft it never dawned on me that he
was on V187 instead of V187E . . . . Later Approach called and said, "Tower says
aircraft is on VI87, not V187E." I said, "Sorry" and hung up. The aircraft was all
by itself and no other aircraft were involved.
15. After takeoff, aircraft A was instructed to turn to heading 070°. Shortly
thereafter he was observed on a track of approximately 140°. He was asked his
present heading to which he replied that he was turning to 170°. He was turned back
left to heading 060° and subsequently climbed on course. There was no incident
during these maneuvers, but there was a potential conflict with aircraft B, which
was resolved by altitude assignment. However, it could have been very critical at a
busier time of day . . . . This situation could have been prevented by more attention
to duty in the cockpit of aircraft A, as tapes verified that heading 070° was issued
and flightcrew read back "heading 070." Later, pilot stated that he and copilot both
understood that a heading of 170° was issued. Hard to believe!
Finally, a pair of miscellaneous mishaps is presented to establish the wide variety of name-
number incidents occurring. In the first of these, the pilot had called for clearance through an Air
Traffic area.
16. Pilot called on what he thought was the local frequency for clearance
through the ATA. He had, in fact, changed to a nearby airport's local frequency
10
(121.3) and was cleared through their ATA. He realized his mistake at the time of
the occurrence and changed to the correct frequency (120.3).
17. When asking for a release, the controller stated, "You can hold him," and
was misinterpreted as saying, "You can roll him." No evasive action was needed, as
the pilot had the other aircraft in sight. A lack of communication was the main
cause of the incident.
Incapacitation
Changes have taken place in air carrier training programs as the result of an excellent simulator
study of incapacitation performed several years ago by United Air Lines. In that study, captains
feigned incapacitation during final approaches in the course of proficiency training. It was found
that it took considerable time for first officers to realize that the pilot flying was no longer "in the
loop"; a substantial number of the flights resulted in "crashes."
The problem of recognizing, and responding to, a serious performance failure is a difficult one.
No professional pilot takes over control from another lightly, especially if the incapacitated pilot is
in command of the airplane. Yet there are clearly cases in which it is necessary to take positive
action to maintain the necessary margin of safety.
Incapacitation, if obvious, poses no such problem. It is when incapacitation appears only in a
performance defect or failure that it becomes a difficult problem to detect and to handle.
These extracts illustrate the capricious nature of failures of performance (Nos. 1 and 2) and
the difficulties inherent in doing something about them when they occur in operational flying
(Nos. 2 and 3). The first two examples are from occurrence reports submitted to the NASA Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System; the third is an extract from an NTSB accident report. (Emphasis
added in the narratives.)
1. Report from first officer, scheduled operation: . . . (We were) cleared to
2300 ft to intercept the approach course and cleared for the approach. Descent was
being made by the captain with the power set at about 1.4 EPR and with the speed
brake extended. Altitude callout was made by the first officer at 3300 ft. Descent
continued through 2300 and another callout was made by the F/O at 2,100 and
1,800 ft, both times stating that we needed to be at 2300 and that we were low. The
second officer made a similar callout at 1,700 ft. Descent continued to 1,500 ft
with speed brake extended and power set. Approach Control called and stated that
he showed our altitude to be 1,500 ft, that we were cleared to 2,300, and to correct.
During the descent the aircraft speed had deteriorated from approximately
230 knots to 190 knots ... as altitude recovery was initiated at about 1,450 ft by
pulling the nose up, the stick shaker activated. The F/O then called out "speed
brake" with substantial volume as he was pushing forward on the yoke. The captain
did not secure the speed brake but instead pulled back on the yoke again and added
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(power) . . . . This time the stick shaker was reactivated and the aircraft began to
buffet. At this point, the F/O called out louder, secured the speed brake, and the
buffet ceased along with the stick shaker . . . . Climb back to correct altitude was
made ... a reasonably normal landing was then completed.
At no time during this flight did the captain ever respond to any callouts or
make (any) himself . . . the pilot is ... competent but sometimes uses nonstandard
(procedures). This time (he) had a lapse in performance where he just couldn 't seem
to get it together. Discussion on the ground was cut off; all approaches observed
since have been more standard and stabilized (according to the book).
2. Report from a first officer: This lengthy report describes a series of serious
altitude and flight-control deviations occurring within a period of several days'
scheduled flying.
The captain was a man I had known for over 20 years. I suppose we had logged
more than a thousand hours together. I considered him to be the finest pilot I had
ever seen . . . my confidence in ... his ability was unshakeable . . . .
Our trip was cleared to proceed directly to ABC and to cross Intersection at
10,000 ft. Center announced that we were overtaking the airplane ahead of us and
requested that we make a 180° turn to the right for a delaying vector. Several
minutes later we were cleared to make (another) 180° turn and to cross Intersection
at 10,000 ft. After reading back the clearance, I noted a bank angle of 60° and a
sink rate of 6,000 ft/min. I sang out, "Watch your bank angle." The captain
acknowledged, "OK," but allowed the attitude to remain as it was . . . . I could not
understand why he had found it necessary to make such a radical turn. I concluded
that he was angry with the delay vector, and that it was the intemperate act of an
angry man. I had never seen him behave like this before, but perhaps he was under
personal stress I did not know of.
The remainder of the approach was normal and the touchdown was smooth.
Passenger reaction was bad ... I was embarassed. The captain made no comment.
The remaining legs of the trip were flown without incident.
[On a subsequent day] We were flying from ABC to DEF with the captain at
the controls. He held the airplane on course heading, even though we encountered a
strong crosswind which should have been countered with at least 10° of drift correc-
tion. I told him several times that we were off course and made many comments
about the strong west wind. He acknowledged all of my comments but made no
corrections. Three times Center called and gave us vectors to get back on course.
The airport was VFR and we were cleared for a visual approach to cross Land-
mark at 3,900 ft or above. When I noted that our altitude was 3,700 ft prior to
reaching Landmark, I said, "We are cleared to cross Landmark at 3,900"; he
acknowledged, but the airplane continued to descend. When the airplane reached
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3,500 ft, I said loudly that our altitude was 3,500, and we were supposed to cross
Landmark at 3,900. He leveled off and we crossed Landmark at 3,500 ft.
[On a following segment] ... I had often marveled at the way this man could
put an airplane on the end of a runway so he had maximum runway for braking and
stopping. I mention this because he now began a visual approach to runway XX
below glide slope, and I assumed he was practicing his low approach. When we
passed 500 ft, I began to comment that we were low. I continued to talk about how
low we were until we reached 200 ft, and I began to yell, "We are too low." I
noticed the rate of (sink) go to zero and we held our altitude, but the airspeed began
to decay. I began to sing out airspeeds, and then I yelled, "We are at reference
speed." He applied some power but not enough; the airspeed continued to decay,
and my callouts became more frantic. The stick shaker began and he instantly
applied more power. The airspeed increased and the touchdown was mooth. I was
shaken; I thought I was going crazy. The greatest pilot I had ever known was flying
like a student, and he didn't even seem concerned . . . (he) even made several com-
ments to the effect that I was becoming overly critical.
[On the following day, during climb] ... He maintained an airspeed of
150 knots through 10,000 ft and then allowed the airplane to accelerate to the
proper speed for the next few minutes. We were cleared to our cruise altitude. After
leaving 20,000 ft, we were IFR in clouds and some light chop when I noticed the
airspeed begin to decay. It is not unusual to trade a little airspeed for altitude if you
feel that an expedited climb will give a smoother ride, and I assumed that was what
he was doing. The airspeed continued to decay until it reached the point where I
found it necessary to comment. Because of his remarks about my being overly criti-
cal, I had reverted to the old military system of hand signals to alert him to his
oversights, and I began to point to the airspeed. He turned and looked at me and
said, "What are you pointing at?" I said, "My airspeed." He said, "Well, what about
your airspeed?" I said, "It reads 200 knots." He said, "So what?" I said, "That's
much too low." He said, "Oh," and pushed forward slightly on the wheel, and the
airspeed began to increase; but several minutes later it was decaying again, and we
could feel . . . the pre-stall burble ... he looked at me and with a big smile on his
face said, "Whatever do you think that is?" ... He then, laughingly, put the auto-
pilot on altitude hold and the airplane began to accelerate; the remainder of the trip
was normal.
... I wondered whether he was testing me in some way. He seemed so uncon-
cerned and disinterested that it was obvious he was not aware of any problems. On
the ground and in the air his speech patterns were normal, and his pleasant, good
humor was unchanged. I knew one thing for sure, I could not fly with this man
again. I was a nervous wreck. I decided to tell my troubles to the office. The office
requested a medical examination, and my longtime friend . . . was found to have a
brain tumor . . . .
In conclusion, with the whole series of events placed together, it is easy to diag-
nose illness as the cause; but when these incidents come one at a time, covered with
a blanket of perfectly normal behavior before and after each incident, it is very
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deceiving. Had I been flying with anyone else, I certainly would have been a great
deal more aggressive in demanding correction. I should have taken the airplane on
the low approach at 500 ft, but don't forget that this man had been my friend for
over 20 years — and confidence like that is very hard to shake.
3. Narrative and Conclusions from NTSB Accident Report AAR-80-1: . . . The
captain was a company vice president with over 20,000 hours who was known to
rarely acknowledge checklist items or other callouts from any first officer. The
first officer, although previously qualified in the DHC-6, had only been with the
company for 2 months. For the first year, pilots are on probation, are not repre-
sented by the pilots' union, and may be terminated with or without cause.
It was within this environment that the first officer's role in this accident must
be evaluated. The first officer testified that he made all of the required callouts
except the "no contact" call and that the captain did not acknowledge any of his
calls. Because the captain rarely acknowledged calls, even (deviation) calls . . . this
lack of response probably would not have alerted the first officer to any physiologic
incapacitation of the captain. However, the first officer should "have been concerned
by the aircraft's steep glidepath, excessive descent rate, and high airspeed. These
three factors limited the amount of time available to the first officer to react once
Flight 248 descended through the decision height.
The poor altitude and pitch control exhibited by the captain and the steep
descent rate that the aircraft achieved should have alerted the first officer to the
existence of an abnormal situation. However, a flight simulator study of subtle
incapacitation conducted by United Air Lines demonstrated that recognition of the
phenomenon by the other crewmember is a difficult task. In the United simulator
study, when the captain feigned subtle incapacitation while flying the aircraft during
an approach, 25 percent of the aircraft hit the "ground." The study also showed a
significant reluctance of the first officer to take control of the aircraft. It required
between 30 sec and 4 min for the other crewmember to recognize the captain was
incapacitated and to correct the situation. The first officer of Flight 248 had 1 min
9 sec from the outer marker to impact. It is quite possible that the first officer also
was suffering from fatigue which dulled his senses and reactions.
If Flight 248 was descending at 1,488 ft/min, it would have descended from
the decision height to impact in about 6 sec and from 100 ft below decision height
to impact in about 2 sec. The short time available from decision height to impact,
coupled with the usual nonresponsiveness of the captain to callouts, made it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the first officer to detect a deteriorating
situation and react once he called decision height and verified that no approach
lights were visible . . . .
Conclusions: . . . The aircraft was 220 ft high at the outer marker. The distance
from the aircraft's last plotted position to impact was 1.29 n. mi. From the aircraft's
last plotted position to impact, the aircraft descended at 120 knots ground speed
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with a descent rate of 1,488 ft/min and a descent angle of 6.976°. The aircraft
descended from the decision height (250 ft) to impact in 6 sec.
The captain was almost 61 years old, a company vice president, and a part-
time line pilot for 14 CFR 135 operations only. The first officer had been with
the company only 2 months. The captain may have lacked proficiency in the
DHC-6, as he had flown only 12 hr in the 90 days preceding the day of the accident.
The captain's lack of recent flying time in instrument meteorological conditions may
have resulted in deteriorated instrument flying proficiency.
The captain had developed hypertension while in military service. Both his
military and FAA medical records reflect the existence of hypertensive cardiovascu-
lar disease. The captain's FAA medical records indicate nonspecific electrocardio-
gram changes, abnormal blood chemistry, and occasional elevated fasting blood
sugar. The captain's autopsy findings revealed a well-healed myocardial infarct and a
40 to 70% occluded left anterior coronary artery. The captain was taking polythia-
zide, a hypertensive medication, and allopurinal, a gout medication. The captain
listed no medications on his most recent FAA medical application form; however,
his military medical records indicate the use of these drugs. Both drugs can be
waivered by FAA AME's if the use of the drugs is known. The captain's only known
food intake occurred in the late afternoon between flights.
The Hyannis weather was near approach minimums, which forced the flight-
crew to fly the ILS and significantly increased the crew's workload. The crew had
worked a 14-hr duty day involving 9 hr 15 min of flight time. The captain was out-
wardly upset when ordered to undertake additional flights at the conclusion of his
anticipated workday.
The probability of the first officer recognizing and reacting to any possible
physiologic incapacitation in the captain was remote . . . .
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THE GO-AROUND MANEUVER IN AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS:
CAUSES AND RESULTING PROBLEMS
W. P. Monan*
A go-around maneuver is neither difficult nor demanding; in pilot jargon, it is a "no sweat"
procedure. The typical flightcrew reaction to go-around is annoyance at the waste of fuel, time, and
effort in pulling out of the approach and a semicynical expectation of long vectors, delay, even
holding, prior to resequencing into the pattern.
However, when placed into the context of the near midair collision risk picture, go-arounds, as
reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), are frequently avoidance or evasive
maneuvers in breakouts from traffic conflicts. Furthermore, these pullouts from approach often
channel the aircraft immediately and precipitously into conflicts with other aircraft in the airport
traffic area. With respect to conflicts, a go-around can be a transition phase — from the frying pan
into the fire.
One hundred ninety-four go-around occurrences involving air carrier scheduled flights were
reported to the ASRS during the period from May 1, 1976 through July 30, 1979 (39 months). As
shown in table 4, 102 of these maneuvers occurred in TCA airspace, and 92 were distributed almost
equally between TRSA and non-Stage III airport operations.
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TABLE 4.-GO-AROUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS







































Traffic conflicts with other aircraft, either converging during the approach or situated on the
landing runway, directly caused 155 go-arounds, (80%); table 5 shows their distribution. Twenty-
three of these conflicts were near midair collisions (NMAC). Thirty-five of the maneuvers (18%)
were reportedly caused by nonconflict operational problems, such as bounced landings, crosswinds,
wake turbulence, too high and too fast, and line-up with wrong parallel runway. Four go-arounds —
all in TCA airspace — had no stated causes.
*Previously regional director of flight operations for an international airline, Captain W. P. Monan serves as an
Aviation Safety Research Consultant at Battelle Columbus Laboratories' ASRS Office.
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TABLE 5.-CONFLICT SITUATIONS AND NMAC'S IN VARIOUS
































Examination of the report narratives showed that airmen and controllers were exceedingly
loose in the descriptive terminology they applied to the maneuver; for example, "pull-out,"
"go-around," "abandoned approach," "aborted landing," "discontinued approach," "missed
approach," "wave-off," "overshoot," appeared indiscriminately. However, only those pullouts from
final approach accomplished in VMC conditions were tallied as go-arounds in this study. Missed
approaches resulting from "no visual contact" at decision height (DH) or at minimum descent alti-
tude (MDA) displayed considerably different operational and human factors than go-arounds; they
were eliminated from this analysis.
Initiating go-around maneuvers did not always resolve the conflicts. Subsequent midair con-
flicts frequently occurred. Review of the narratives disclosed that one-third of the 155 conflict-
generated go-arounds sequenced immediately into additional midair conflicts, of which 18 could be
classified as near midair collisions (table 6).



























The number of conflicts occurring in the go-around phase suggested the possibility that in
VMC weather conditions ATC controllers were work- and habit-conditioned to expect the continua-
tion of an air carrier approach into a completed landing. Unexpected go-arounds sometimes resulted
in hasty, unplanned, or incompleted coordination reactions.
I watched on radar as an air carrier on a go-around merged with another aircraft that
was departing off runway 04. Apparently no separation was being exercised. Then
they dumped them both on to my frequency; both pilots were somewhat mad, to
say the least.
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We were advised we were overtaking traffic and told to climb out to 3,000 ft. At
1,800 ft, we broke out of some rain showers, found ourselves head-on with another
aircraft at our twelve o'clock position. I feel no provision was made for a go-around
in the controller traffic picture.
At approximately 600 ft the captain spotted the aircraft on the go-around. He was
about 500 to 600 ft away and converging on us. We leveled off and then noted the
other aircraft make an abrupt upward pitch change indicating they had seen us.
They then passed over us.
Causal Factors in Conflict-Generated Go-Arounds
Since go-around maneuvers happen fast, at low altitude, and within the close confines of the
terminal area, the cause-and-effect relationships that triggered the physical conflict situations were
invariably direct, rapid moving, almost domino-style in the immediacy of their effect.
The causal factors that directed or permitted movement of one aircraft into the projected
flightpath of another on final approach could be divided into two broad classifications:
1. Human behavioral failures, by airmen or ATC controllers, usually stated objectively in the
reports as errors, omissions, or coordination breakdowns.
2. The coincidental presence of operational situations or flight activities involving adjoining
parallel runways, airspeed performance mix, training aircraft on opposite-direction practice instru-
ment approaches, pilot use of back-course ILS localizer approach, nearby peripheral airports, and
other secondary environmental conditions.
These operational variables represented happenstances that did not directly cause the conflicts
by their presence or action, but linked coincidentally into the chain of causal events which precede
every aviation accident or serious incident.
In some reports (usually self-admitted revelations of error), airmen and controllers touched
upon sensitive, subjective human factors, which tended to explain the factual details of the mis-
takes. These psychological and physiological factors included distractions, worry, workload, aggres-
sion, schedule pressure, anger, inexperience, even the pressing requirement for restroom facilities.
These forces sometimes could be defined as the root causes of behavioral failures.
I kept making mistakes all day. I couldn't keep my mind on the traffic. I asked the
supervisor for relief but he said he couldn't spare me. It was a boy! 8 pounds
3 ounces!
Analysis of primary causal factors— The physical conflict situations that were the immediate
causes of most of the go-arounds (155) were classified into in-flight and on-the-ground operational
phases, according to ATC airspace configuration. The distribution of these by airspace is shown in
table 7.
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TABLE 7.-CONFLICT-GENERATED GO-AROUNDS CLASSIFIED
BY FLIGHT PHASE AND AIRSPACE CONFIGURATIONS
Conflict situations
In-flight convergence
























In-flight occurrences— Review of the in-flight occurrences indicated close associations with
physical runway layouts and various flight activities. These subdivided into more specific categories
in table 8.
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trail or converging in
approach








































All parallel runway in-flight conflicts were a result of airmen misperceptions or
misunderstandings.
On final, I told the first officer to go to the right. Then I realized I had made a
mistake. We were lined up with the wrong runway. At this time I discovered we had
come close to another air carrier on approach to the parallel runway.
After turning final, air carrier aligned himself with the right runway instead of the
left parallel. This placed him directly in front of another aircraft. Evasive action was
taken by instructing the air carrier to go-around.
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We were on ILS for 9L. The foreign airliner overshot the 9R ILS course and went
over the top of us. Then he crossed back over the top of us again as he corrected
back to the localizer. We dived below the glide slope and pulled out.
The overtaking in-trail and approach cutoff conflicts during single runway operation (74 total)
frequently reflected controller spacing problems in expediting heavy traffic.
I knew that it would be close. I was trying to get out as many departures as possible.
I had -10 aircraft ready to go with more coming.
A mile out, we saw an airplane in position for takeoff. Later, the tower supervisor
told me the controller was only trying to move traffic and he couldn't fault him
for that.
The pressures of traffic sometimes induced controllers to "squeeze in" a visual approach
between two arrivals. Usually, this aircraft was a small slower plane sequenced ahead of a faster air
carrier transport. The attempted integration of mixed performance aircraft often set up an over-
taking situation that resulted in a go-around.
This tower will tell you your sequence number and then keep slipping light aircraft
into the pattern. Three miles out Tower said we were overtaking another aircraft.
The pilot then said he had us in sight. I thought he might be under us so I executed a
go-around.
Told to contact Tower at the outer marker and that a light twin was being posi-
tioned in front of us. No visual contact made. We contacted Tower; he said the twin
was ahead of us and we were faster. When the twin reported short final we were sent
around.
The coincidences of parallel runway operations and the mix of slow and fast aircraft linked
into these TCA approach conflicts.
Cleared visual approach to the right runway. We were on localizer and on glide slope
just inside the outer marker when my copilot took over, made a pullup and turn to
miss a light aircraft that had been previously cleared to land on the left runway.
At approximately 300 ft we put on our landing lights and saw a small plane ahead,
very close, on approach to the same runway. The copilot was flying. I yelled "don't
pull up, you'll hit him! Go under!!" We put full power on the aircraft and went
underneath him and then pulled out.
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Although the air carrier was instructed to follow me, he overtook me on final. I was
about 15 ft above the runway when the tower advised me to go around.
During initial analysis of the overtaking conflicts during the approach phase, the enabling
factors in the occurrences appeared to be simple and uncomplicated controller misjudgments in
spacing traffic flow.
However, upon closer study of the in-trail overtakings in all categories of terminal airspace, it
became obvious that an independent and more significant factor was present in the potential con-
flict situations: the attempted integration of slower aircraft, usually prop-type equipment, into the
approach sequences of faster, usually jet-type, aircraft. This airspeed mix was a primary element.
Routine cbntroller action aligned the incompatible mix of aircraft into the single file procession
that precipitated the overtaking conflict.
It was determined, therefore, that go-arounds revealed in an indirect fashion the latent hazard
potential in airspeed performance differences during operations in terminal airspace.
Ground occurrences— Table 9 summarizes aircraft-on-the-runway conflict events. These were
correlated statistically with runway layouts and human behavioral factors. Aircraft caught in a
"position and hold" situation on the runway were more frequently reported, especially in heavy
TCA traffic operations. Controller plans that did not work out often resulted in what might be
termed the classic active runway conflict: one aircraft cleared for takeoff but unable or unwilling
to initiate the takeoff run due to a second aircraft still on his landing or takeoff roll with a third
aircraft close in and cleared to land.
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We were cleared for immediate takeoff. I replied we would not start our takeoff
until the runway was clear. The controller then became very insistent that we start
our roll. I again refused. The airliner on approach was forced to go-around.
Controller misjudgments of spacing did not always cause the conflicting occupancy of the
active runway. Ten go-arounds were due to pilots missing turnoffs, exiting the runway slowly, or
initiating the takeoff run late.
The pilot replied "Okay, we're rolling." But he did not roll immediately.
* *
I asked the air carrier if he was on the roll yet. He said "I'm all powered up and
passing the last VASI now.
* * *
I don't understand why it took 2-1/2 to 3 min for him to start his takeoff after I
cleared him to go. This delay resulted in a very nerve-wracking incident.
As in the midair conflicts, parallel runway mixups during ground operations often resulted in
go-arounds.
The foreign-registered aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 11R. Instead, he drove
on to 11L and then stayed on the runway. He spoke very little English . . . .
The tower issued instructions which I understood to be "Cross the runway!" As I
taxiied across, I heard the tower giving hurried instructions for a jet to go around.
Eight of the 10 parallel runway on-the-ground incidents were attributed to airman misinterpretation
of clearances.
Overall, in the 155 go-arounds, controller actions precipitated 72 and airmen actions caused 82
(one incident gave no causal details). Fifteen of the pilot-at-fault incidents occurred at airports
without towers.
Published missed-approach procedure problems— A significant finding in the review of air
carrier go-arounds was this: the abrupt and belated recognition by many airmen that the published
missed-approach procedures often could not be adhered to and were sometimes potentially hazard-
ous when a VMC go-around became necessary.
ASRS go-around reports support the view that published missed-approach climbouts (MAPS)
were designed for use during full IFR operations. They did not necessarily accommodate VMC
traffic conditions. Recognition of an imminent conflict predicament always occurred during the
initiation of or in the decisionmaking for a go-around. As the aircraft trajectory changed, or was
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about to be changed, airman attention shifted to traffic flow movements that, up to that particular
moment, had been nonessential information for the approach.
For example, go-arounds started during simultaneous parallel runway operations occasionally
precipitated the abrupt realization that the published missed-approach climbout path directly over-
laid the departure track of aircraft lifting off almost beneath the go-around.
Aircraft were departing on the left runway with arrival aircraft coming in on the
right parallel runway.
We had a minor control problem and advised the tower we were executing a missed
approach. As we started to climb, (I'd hate to call it panic) there was what I'll call
severe concern on the part of the controller as he repeatedly called for a departing
jet to abort his takeoff. It was at that moment that the "big picture" became appar-
ent and I realized I was going to write you folks another letter.
On many approach plates, the back-course ILS missed-approach procedure prescribes a straight-
ahead climbout directly to the outer marker. A back-course ILS localizer approach may appear to
be a routine, timesaving maneuver until a potential or actual go-around brings realization that the
procedure mandates a climb head-on into front-course traffic flow.
If we followed the patterned procedure for the back course we would have been in
a very dangerous situation, because it called for straight-ahead path to OM. The MAP
obviously never had this situation in mind. As I realized the situation, I broke off to
the left and advised Tower what I was doing. He seemed confused. He told me to
make a right turn, which would have placed us head-on to the opposite traffic.
In several back-course reports to the ASRS, an unimportant cloud cover, trivial in the approach
operation, suddenly became more threatening than a thunderhead when the go-around pilot realized
that he would be heading into clouds concealing the front-course ILS traffic.
An abrupt, unilateral pilot decision not to follow the MAP procedure can be equally hazard-
ous. In one air carrier occurrence a quick 180° turnout of a high, fast approach placed the airliner
nose-to-nose with an inbound aircraft in the adjoining approach lane.
There was substantial evidence in ASRS reports that cockpit planning for possible VMC
go-arounds should envision specific traffic conflict contingencies that were neither contemplated
nor designed in published IFR missed-approach procedures.
Analysis of human factors in go-arounds— Incidents in which movement of an aircraft into the
projected path of another airplane on final approach resulted in a go-around were initially cata-
logued in association with airport runway layouts and other pertinent operational circumstances.
Human factors, as secondary circumstances, often surfaced in these report narratives. There
appeared to be some variation in the patterns of human factor associations among different types
of terminal airspace and operational patterns.
23
TCA terminal airspace: The largest number of reports of go-arounds associated with conflicts
during air carrier operations was from TCA terminal airspace. There were 80, of which 29 occurred
in the air, and 51 took place on the active runway. Table 10 shows the distribution of these
go-around occurrences by cause and runway layout.
Parallel runway layouts appeared to be a particular "pilot trap" with 13 of 14 TCA incidents
attributed to airman confusion in the runways. Intersecting runways often displayed the latent
hazard potential of light aircraft crossing the takeoff/landing runway being used by heavy jet air
carriers.
In addition to the tabulated operating conditions, the condition "runway change in progress,"
though seldom given much attention in studies of conflicts, appeared as a significant contributor
of go-around conflicts. Switching the active runways not only led to approach/climb encounters
but sometimes set up hazardous head-on situations. The first operation on the "new" runway some-
times found itself pointed at the last operation on the "old" runway. This ATC operational pro-
cedure was especially critical at busy and congested TCA airports.
Runway change in progress. I was the local controller working the two runways.
When the air carrier — the first aircraft on approach to the changed runway — was
inside the outer marker, I started calling him to issue missed-approach instructions.
No answer. He finally called on short final stating he was executing a go-around.
There was a possibility of a collision if the air carrier had not seen the other aircraft
taking off on the other runway. Visibility was only 1/2 mile in rain and fog.
We were approximately 7 DME out of 3,000 ft when we were cleared for the ILS
27R and told to contact the tower. It was at this moment that we spotted a small
aircraft at our altitude, opposite direction, heading straight for us. We instituted an
immediate steep turn to avoid collision. In a subsequent phone conversation with
the tower I was told that runway 14 had been in use but just prior to our arriving,
Operations had been changed to runway 28. Although the change in runways indi-
cated a change in traffic flow, ATC had allowed a VFR departure to take off in the
previous traffic flow direction.
We were just changing runway configurations as I relieved on the local control posi-
tion. I told the controller I had the picture and assumed the position. The next
transmission I received was from an air taxi "In position and hold," wanting to
know what the lights were coming at him down the runway.
One of the objectives of this go-around study was to search for correlations of human factors
with coincidental operational circumstances that resulted in conflicts. Many reports offered no
leads for determination of the subjective causes for the incidents. Other narratives did supply
descriptive details that yielded some insight into the elusive "why" of human error. A selection of
12 occurrence reports is presented in table 11. The report narratives are broken up, in this table, to
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TABLE 10.-GO-AROUND CAUSES: HUMAN FACTOR ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH






Pilot lined up approach to wrong runway
New first officer distractions (2)
Tuned in wrong ILS frequency (1)
Sun glare (1)







Pilot entered or aligned wrong runway






Vectoring too close to final
Racing: aircraft on ILS flight check
Pilot mixup of runways
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Position and hold (8)
Aircraft on takeoff run (2)
Aircraft on landing roll (2)
Runway change in progress (4)
Back-course ILS in use (2)
Three-aircraft situation
Controller spacing (3)
Pilot slow to exit (5)
Pilot slow starting takeoff run
Icy runways (2)
Unknown (3)
Pilot slow to exit after landing
Gear problem (1)
Unknown (1)











TABLE 11.-CORRELATION OF HUMAN FACTORS WITH OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
TCA GO-AROUND OCCURRENCES
Action Conflict Human factor
On final approach I told the first
officer to go to the right. Then I
realized I had made a mistake. We
were lined up for the wrong runway.
At this time I discovered we had
come close to another air carrier on
approach to the parallel runway.
I was busy inside the cockpit
directing a first officer who was on
his second trip.
We were cleared for the ILS to
27R.
A break occurred in the clouds. I
glanced left and saw another air
carrier about 200 to 300 ft away
and closing.
Later, we were told a training
flight had been cleared for an ILS
to 27L but instead had tuned in the
27R frequency.
First officer flying, captain com-
municating. The F/O should have
tuned in the ILS, instead he was
still on the VOR.
None He was inexperienced in the
right seat, having just completed
9 years at the flight engineer
position.
During ILS approach flag alarms
on both G.S. indicators. We executed
a go-around.
I was asked why we delayed
advising the tower about our go-
around since there had been a
potential conflict with a simultan-
eous takeoff on parallel runway.
I had always thought that
approach/landing airspace was
completely protected for all oper-
ations including the ever present
contingency of a go-around.
We were cleared to cross 25R
and hold in position 25 L. The first
officer asked the tower "Into posi-
tion, right?" The tower then
replied "Into position, 25, right."
This caused an air carrier on final
to 25 R to abandon his approach.
The tower and crew both agreed
it was bad verbiage.
(Controller) I was on the last
work hour of the last day of the
week.
First officer flying the approach
went through the localizer. Soon
afterward, approach control
requested climbout and another
approach.
None Fatigue may have been a factor.
We had made 11 landings in the
past 24 hr.
We were cleared to cross the
active with an air carrier on landing
approach.
As we cleared, I saw the airliner
at about 100 ft retract his gear and
go around.
We were in a "heavy" and it
took a lot of power and time to get
it moving.
Air carrier cleared to land. Landing aircraft still on the run-
way, go-around initiated.
When I asked about it, I was told
tower controller training was going
on.
We were cleared to land when
we had another aircraft ask the
tower what our speed was. We
replied 138K, and he said he was at
140K. We understood that the other
aircraft was intending a low pass out
of an ILS check.
At 600 ft, it was evident that we
were on a possible collision course
where the two runways intersect. I
told the tower it did not look good,
that one of us would have to go
around. The tower then told the
check flight to abandon his
approach.
The ILS flight check pilot said
over the radio: "Maybe we can beat
him (the air carrier) to the field."
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TABLE 11.-CONCLUDED.
Action Conflict Human factor
I thought I heard a transponder
code and "cleared for immediate
takeoff."
I set the squawk and pushed the
throttles up. After beginning the
roll I heard the roar of engines
which later proved to be the traffic
going around.
I should not have let the control-
ler's clearance for an immediate
takeoff pressure me to roll.
Less than 2 miles out on final
the tower cleared another aircraft
for takeoff.
The air carrier was just turning
onto the icy approach end of the
runway when we executed a
go-around.
The controller seemed amazed
that I should question his judg-
ment. Apparently some controllers
are unaware of the extra time it
takes to taxi an aircraft on icy
runways.
Weather was more than adequate
for a back-course approach.
A mile out we saw an airplane
in position for takeoff.
Later, the supervisor told us that
the tower operator was only trying
to move traffic and he couldn't
fault him for that.
isolate the human factor component of each narrative and to correlate it with the other salient
aspects of the occurrence.
TRSA terminal airspace: The number of conflict-generated go-arounds (40) associated with
air carrier operations in TRSA airspace was exactly half of the TCA conflict count. Table 12 shows
the distribution of these go-arounds. The on-the-ground runway incidents were considerably fewer
in number than in the case of TCA's, suggesting reduced pressures of traffic flow. The three
reported runway mixups, with the "position and hold" aircraft unable to take off, were all charged
by controllers to pilot delay.
Aircraft on practice instrument approaches were a significant factor in TRSA go-around sta-
tistics. Eight incidents were associated directly or indirectly with this training activity. Touch-
and-go practice contributed to three additional go-arounds. Additionally, the sighting of opposite
direction practice approach aircraft head-on to the approach aircraft occasioned other airman
reports which expressed concern about potential collision hazards if go-arounds had been
attempted.
As noted in TCA operations, there was considerable evidence that suggested that TRSA air-
port procedures involved an implicit assumption that air carriers would not execute go-arounds.
Intersecting runway spacings of departures and arrivals, simultaneous releases of takeoffs with
landings on an adjacent parallel runway, clearances permitting opposite-direction flow, landing
clearances to stop prior to crossing active intersection — these practices suggest that controllers
operated on the basis of a broad assumption that no go-arounds would be made.
Our scheduled flight was cleared to land runway 02 with a light aircraft executing a
practice low approach to runway 20. He was sighted over the departure end of the
runway at approximately 400 ft.
27
TABLE 12.-GO-AROUND CAUSES: HUMAN FACTOR ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH RUNWAY
LAYOUTS AT TRSA AIRPORTS
In-flight events On-runway events
Error/cause Number Error/cause Number
Parallel runway operations
Pilot lined up approach on wrong runway
Similar flight number (1)










Military aircraft on takeoff not on tower
frequency (1)









Failure to see and avoid traffic
Pilot identified wrong traffic (1)
No sighting of converging traffic (1)
Unknown traffic in approach lane (2)
Unauthorized traffic in ATA
Pilot racing to runway (1)













Pilot delayed takeoff (1)
Pilot slow to exit (1)
Pilot overshot turnoff (1)
Controller judgment of spacing
"Position-and-hold" error (2)
Aircraft on takeoff run (4)
Aircraft taxiing on/across active runway
Briefing relief controller error (1)
Pilot misunderstood clearance (1)
Total 11
We had a 30-knot crosswind with higher gusts. If we had gone around, initiating a
go-around with traffic at twelve o'clock at low altitude had possibilities of a midair.
We had assumed the tower was going to break off his approach but he did not do so.
Controllers have been conditioned to expect an air carrier to always land, especially
in good weather.
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One TRSA go-around conflict also displayed the hazard potential in the current military
fighter practice of changing frequency to departure control prior to takeoff. In one military/air
carrier mix, an unexpected pullout from an approach to an intersecting runway was executed with
the local controller unable to communicate abort instructions to the fighters already on the roll.
Human factor elements associated with airport runway layouts were revealed in various TRSA
episodes.
In a few conflict-into-conflict incidents, an air carrier was forced into consecutive go-arounds.
A light aircraft on base was told to keep his speed up, as an air carrier was following
him. The air carrier was too fast, was overtaking, and was sent around. When he
went around, he made a 360° turn back into final and conflicted with another light
aircraft on final. These airplanes were very close. They came almost side by side,
with the light aircraft perhaps 200 ft ahead of the air carrier. The air carrier pilot
said later he never saw the small aircraft. The light aircraft was turned out and the
air carrier went around again.
Training aircraft activities were coincidental operations in TRSA terminal airspace that some-
times interfered with the approach phase and, at other times, confronted the go-around airplane in
the climbout.
The first officer was flying and concentrating on the go-around. As I reached over
to raise the gear I saw a small airplane in the center of my windshield. I used both
hands to push forward on the yoke. The nose dropped and we passed under the
light aircraft. The controller then gave us a left turn but I told the copilot to hold
our heading. Later I was told that the twin was on a practice back-course approach.
Other training/air carrier mix reports did not narrate actual conflicts and these submissions
were not included in the go-around citations given here. However, although "go-around thrust" was
not ordered, the conflict potentialities of the situation disturbed several reporting airmen.
Had we gone around, there was a practice ILS aircraft in our go-around path.
A light aircraft was executing a practice low approach from the opposite direction.
If we had been forced to make a go-around, a midair would have been quite possible.
A further selection of the TRSA go-around reports is shown in table 13. These reports have
been arranged in a manner similar to that shown in table 11 in order to associate the human factors
in the occurrences with the other salient aspects.
Non-Stage III terminal airspace: Twenty midair and 15 on-the-runway conflicts were reported
as the primary causes for go-arounds associated with air carrier operations at non-Stage III airports.
Table 14 shows the distribution of these reports.
Since many of these incidents occurred at fields without towers or Unicom, the reports had
causal elements that varied considerably from those causes indicated in TCA and TRSA controlled
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TABLE 13.-CORRELATION OF HUMAN FACTORS WITH OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
IN TRSA GO-AROUND OCCURRENCES
Action Conflict Human factor
On downwind we were asked if
we saw our traffic. We replied affir-
mative and were then changed over
to tower.
At about 300 ft we put on our
landing lights and saw a small plane
immediately ahead of us and very
close. We put on full power and went
underneath him.
At no time were we advised that
we were overtaking a small aircraft.
We were on the final to 28L
when asked4f weight permitted,
could we accept 28R. We agreed.
It seems that another aircraft
was on approach to 28R.
Later, we were asked by phone
if our trip (789) had possibly
accepted the clearance for flight
879.
I was working local control,
observing an air carrier being
sequenced on approach behind a
slower air taxi. When the airliner
was switched over to my frequency,
I told him to go around.
He was at 2,700 ft southbound
when I advised him that his traffic
was crossing over the airport at
2,600 ft. I told him to climb.
I had advised the approach con-
troller that I thought the air carrier
would not fit behind the slower
aircraft ahead. The controller
replied "We know that," but he did
nothing.
When the arrival was 2-1/2 miles
out, I asked the air carrier if he was
on the roll yet.
The air carrier on 1/2 mile final
told me he was going around.
The air carrier pilot still on the
runway said "I'm all powered up
and passing the last VASI now."
The air carrier was cleared for
takeoff with traffic on 3-mile final.
He was not moving and finally
the tower said "Take off imme-
diately or clear the runway."
The pilot replied "Okay, we're
rolling." But he did not roll imme-
diately. The aircraft on approach
went around.
When the ground controller asked
the controller if he could cross an
air carrier over 08L he was given
clearance to do so.
As the taxiing aircraft crossed
the active, the local controller
instructed an aircraft on final to go
around.
In briefing me, the cab coordi-
nator had neglected to mention an
aircraft landing on 08L.
I advised him that he appeared
to be rapidly overtaking his traffic.
The pilot replied: "Yeah, guess
we'll have to go around."
Instead, he continued approach
and passed the other aircraft close
enough to be "pretty hairy."
Later, one pilot said that he
didn't appreciate the other air-
craft's racing to be in the lead.
As we intercepted the localizer,
the tower advised that another
aircraft was on the ILS practice
instrument approach.
We couldn't spot the other air-
craft. And we were at the exact
location reported for the trainer.
We continued to express our
concern and the tower finally told
us that Approach Control would
break off the practice approach.
Shades of the midair at San Diego.
No mention of traffic. We were
changed over to tower.
We took evasive action to keep
from descending on light aircraft in
front of us.
We were never told that we were
behind a slower aircraft.
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TABLE 14.-GO-AROUND CAUSES: HUMAN FACTOR ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH RUNWAY






Pilot lost visual sighting










Controller spaced aircraft in crisscrossing

















Traffic not sighted (1)
Airspeed differential (1)
Pilot distraction (1)
Intrafacility coordination — late H/0
6
0)
Opposite-direction traffic (nontower airport) 4
Unknown traffic (2)
Practice back-course ILS (1)
NORAC during pilot training (1)
VFR traffic in approach lane
(nontower airport)
NORAC on Unicom (2)
Unknown traffic (3)








Aircraft on takeoff roll
Controller spacing error (2)
Aircraft disabled in snow bank on takeoff
Landing aircraft with opposite-direction
approach (nontower airport)
No call on Unicom (2)
Aggression (1)
Taxi on/across active runway (non-tower
airport)










areas. Without ATC restraints, the human factors became more prominent, occasionally quite
obvious, in an undisciplined display of aggression. At times, it appeared that cockpit casualness
developed into full-blown complacency.
Conflicts were often associated with an airman's refusal to use "party line" Unicom communi-
cations. One air carrier touched down and then encountered a light aircraft also touching down on
an opposite direction landing. After an evasive go-around, a belated call to Unicom by the flight-
crew revealed the presence of two training aircraft practicing touch and go's at the airport.
Although cockpit atmosphere is rarely described in ASRS narratives, it was not too surprising that
the report included the statement "On the next approach we were too high and fast and went
around again."
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The airport was uncontrolled. Traffic was reported on 34. I elected to land on 22,
because of smoother runway surface. We made two calls on Unicom. No acknowl-
edgment. I continued the approach and landed.
During our landing roll an aircraft passed overhead, approximately 200 ft. He had
apparently been on final (to 34) and made a waveoff.
A response to our radio would have avoided this close call.
VFR aircraft were conflict elements associated with limited airspace controls in the non-
Stage III airport traffic areas. Unknown VFR aircraft not only cut through approach lanes but
became head-on targets with only the see-and-avoid concept as protection.
Twenty-six- of the 35 go-arounds reported at non-Stage III airports were attributed to pilot
actions, judgments, or perceptions. These causal statistics reflected the total absence of ATC con-
trols at the facilities without towers, where airmen necessarily assumed all traffic separation func-
tions. However, airman errors were also reported more frequently than controller failures or mis-
judgments during tower-controlled non-Stage III airspace operations.
One of the more disturbing reports was not a go-around but controller concern that a
go-around might be executed. With the runway in sight, an air carrier crew opted for an approach to
a short, icy runway with a reported 20-30-knot tailwind. High mountainous terrain ahead was so
close to the airport that the controller was uncertain that the tailwind would not carry a potential
go-around into the hills before the prescribed 180° turn for the pullout could be made. Much to the
relief of the controller, the landing was successful.
A selection of nine go-around reports is presented in table 15. As in the previous sections,
. these reports have been arranged in order to associate the human factors in the occurrences with
other salient aspects.
Midair conflicts subsequent to initiation of go-arounds— Fifty go-around maneuvers carried
directly and immediately into additional midair conflicts during the climbouts. These statistics do
not include incidents in which the go-around aircraft passed over another aircraft on the runway.
Table 16 shows the distribution of these conflicts.
When a conflict-into-conflict comparison was made, it was noted that these 50 climbout con-
flicts make up a third of the conflict-generated go-arounds. These statistics indicate that about
one in every three conflict-caused pullouts reported to the ASRS resulted in another conflict.
Twenty-six of these 50 subsequent conflicts occurred in TCA airspace. The remaining 24 mid-
air encounters were almost equally distributed between TRSA and non-Stage III airport areas.
The conflicts that took place subsequent to execution of the go-arounds were often character-
ized by delayed pilot sighting or tardy controller intervention. In some incidents, neither avoidance
nor evasive action was taken.
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TABLE 15.-CORRELATION OF HUMAN FACTORS WITH OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
IN NON-STAGE III GO-AROUND OCCURRENCES
Action Conflict Human factor
We landed, called the air carrier
numerous times to wave him off,
plus turning on our landing lights
and finally contemplated heading
for the "boonies."
The air carrier finally did go
around.
The air carrier never used the
Unicom frequency. They seldom do
at this airport . . . .
I advised the first officer to call
on Unicom that we were taking the
runway.
As I nosed into the runway a call
came back from an aircraft that was
close in on base. I could not get off
the runway in time so he had to go
around.
After the fact I recognized that
we were rushing too much. In a
way, I may have felt too familiar
with the operations at this airport.
We landed, executed a 180°
on the runway to taxi to the termi-
nal. (No taxiways at this airport.)
We then saw a small aircraft on
final head-on to us. The aircraft
kept descending to approximately
50 ft, straight at us.
We had no time to turn and run
away from him. Our only alterna-
tive was to taxi into the ditch.
Unicom told him we were still
on the runway and the pilot
answered he was going to land any-
way. I grabbed the mike and yelled,
"No, you are not going to land.
Take the SOB around!" The pilot
said he was going to file a violation
against me for using bad language
over the radio.
A heavy jet was on final. The
light plane was told to go around.
The pilot acknowledged, and then
kept coming.
As the air carrier flared for his
landing, the light aircraft passed in
front of him. The jet made an
abrupt left bank and climbed out.
He repeated that he had just had a
near miss.
The small-plane pilot was visibly
shook up. He said he was getting
ready to his commercial license and
hoped no one would hear of this.
They cut in a light airplane when
we were about 800 ft on final.
When they realized it was not going
to work they told him to turn left
which would have turned him right
into us.
He hesitated and by this time
he was so close in front of us that
we had to go around.
This tower has a habit of giving
you a sequence number and then
keep slipping light aircraft into the
pattern ahead of you.
After I instructed the military
trainer to go around, the air carrier
pilot kept blocking any acknowl-
edgment from the other aircraft.
I couldn't communicate with
him but I watched to make sure
that he was going around.
The air carrier pilot kept asking
what the other pilot was doing and
then said "Tell him to get the hell
out of there!" He wouldn't keep
quiet.
I was given a traffic advisory
about an air carrier on approach.
Despite all my looking I couldn't
spot him.
Finally, I saw the air carrier. He
was less than 100 yards away, at
my right and slightly above me. I
applied full power, turned hard
left, and made a slight dive.
I was quite agitated . . . . All the




Action Conflict Human factor
I cleared the aircraft for
immediate takeoff. I felt I could
still accommodate the aircraft on




The supervisor told me to send
him around.
At 600 ft and 2 miles from the
runway, we observed a light aircraft
turning into our flightpath. We
indicated a go-around.
The tower said no traffic
reported in our area.


























I watched on radar as an air carrier on a go-around merged with the target of a
departing climbing aircraft. No control was apparent.
An aircraft was observed on radar at the time B was at the west boundary. I do not
know how close they came. Both targets merged at 4,000 ft about 2 miles south-
west of the airport.
After I told the air carrier to go-around my attention was diverted to coordination
with departure control. When I looked again he was still on runway heading and
closing on another aircraft.
The situation was allowed to deteriorate with one aircraft landing R21, one air-
craft departing R21 and one aircraft on a go-around from R29 turning 210°. My
attention was diverted . . . .
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I told A if he did not see the airport to make an immediate right turn to 300°. He
did this. Then I observed a target on a 3-mile final to runway 12. I asked the
approach controller if he knew who it was. He told me it was aircraft C. This aircraft
had not been coordinated and we were riot talking to the pilot. No evasive action
was required between the aircraft but I'm not sure.
The physical layouts of the runways in use, the proximity of nearby airports, en route VFR
traffic, practice instrument approaches, and runway-change-in-progress were associated factors that
could be identified in 36 of the 50 subsequent conflicts. These associated factors are shown in
table 17.
TABLE 17.- ASSOCIATED CAUSAL FACTORS IN SECONDARY





Proximity of peripheral airport
En route VFR traffic in area
Practice instrument approaches






































These conflicts during go-around usually occurred immediately after the initiation of the
maneuver: 21 of the 50 encounters were with aircraft on initial climb after takeoff.
Aircraft lifting from single or parallel runways underneath the go-around aircraft were the
most frequently noted phase of flight. Intersecting runway conflicts were numerically significant
with the hazard potential implicit in any crossing runway operations.
Such cross landings set up a real go-around danger if both aircraft decide to "Go"
at the same time.
I watched the go-around merge with an air taxi lifting from an intersecting runway.
One aircraft lifted off and stayed low. He maintained about 50 ft through the inter-
section. The go-around aircraft overflew him by about 500 ft.
* * *
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We had to maintain approximately 50 ft through the intersection as the go-around
aircraft climbed over us.
Many reports described occurrences during which the go-around aircraft passed directly over
an aircraft on the runway. These were not tabulated as subsequent conflicts inasmuch as the flight-
path was diverging and danger of collision minimum or nonexistent. However, the vertical separa-
tion was often alarming to the participants or the observers:
His go-around took him directly over us on our landing roll.
I was cleared to cross but the jet was so close I chose to turn the corner and taxi
down the runway to the nearest exit to avoid being in the center of the runway. I
chose the turning evasion so that if the two planes collided I would be hit by the
jet's wing rather than his fuselage.
The aircraft on takeoff roll crossed beneath our aircraft. It was an alarming
noise . . . .
# * *
The air carrier's rotation on his go-around was extremely slow and flat. Thus, a
near-miss as he went over us on our landing roll.
Controller phrases and sentences characterized the ground/air conflicts.
I knew it would be close b u t . . . .
I told him to climb fast!
* * *
* * *
I observed "A" pass above "B" . . . .
* * *
He was rolling through the intersection when the air carrier went over him by about
100ft.
* * *
He flew directly over the air carrier at about 200 ft of altitude.
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Although human factors frequently had been discernible and identifiable in the causal ele-
ments that had generated the go-arounds, the operational confusion enveloping the conflicts after
initiation of the pullouts clouded the details of the reports.
In many incidents there were no human factors involved. The go-around maneuvers in them-
selves precipitated conflicts with aircraft already lifted off and climbing underneath or crisscrossing
the flightpath of the go-around airplane.
I was captain on airliner A departing from airport. Immediately after liftoff, before
I could call for gear up, I saw a four-engine airliner B at my 10:30 position; he
appeared to be executing a go-around. The tower then called B to "keep it climbing"
and told me "to keep it low." We were able to avoid each other by a respectable
margin.
Just as we lifted off, we heard another air carrier report they were going around. As
we started a left turn, the go-around aircraft came into view, about 500 ft away and
about 300 ft above . . . .
Just as the aircraft rotated we were told to go-around. We both climbed but we were
overtaking him. We passed over him with less than 200 ft lateral and 100 ft vertical
separation.
The air carrier was at 4,400 ft and 280 knots groundspeed at the outer marker. The
pilot said he could make it. But he did not. He pulled up directly into the path of
an airplane crossing overhead the airport.
At approximately 600 ft, the captain spotted the aircraft on the go-around. He was
about 500/600 ft away and converging. The other aircraft made an abrupt upward
pitch change, indicating they had seen us and then they passed over us.
Breakdowns in the coordination required to introduce an unanticipated go-around into occu-
pied airspace controlled by other ATC sectors could be identified in some reports.
During a 1-hr period, the tower at this facility made a complete mockery of the
term "ATC." In one incident, an air carrier made a pullout from approach with
another air carrier departing in front of him. Both aircraft were handed off to me in
departure control at the same place at the same time with the departure cleared to
climb through the go-around aircraft above him.
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The tower was screwing up, letting departures go without any coordination.
* * *
A go-around aircraft merged with an aircraft that had just taken o f f . . . .
* * *
A go-around, (first officer flying). As I reached over to raise the gear, I saw a small
aircraft in the left center portion of my windshield. A collision was imminent; I
used both hands to push forward on the yoke — the nose dropped and we passed
under the light aircraft. I then suggested to the controller that he get organized.
The approach controller was too busy to make all the necessary coordinations. One
controller was working arrivals and departures with no assistance available.
Traffic was not called because the controller thought the two altitude displays were
from only one aircraft. Such "slashes" occasionally happen in this area.
Three or four seconds later the "slash" turned out to be an air carrier on a missed
approach.
The local controller had not informed departure radar . . . .
The operational sequences of various conflict events triggered by execution of go-around
maneuvers are noted below. In numerous incidents narrated by airmen, the tower controller advised
departures of the overtaking or crossing go-around aircraft. Some of the ensuing conflicts resulted
from incorrect turn instructions. In other incidents, the pilot's unilateral decision to turn caused the
go-around conflict.
The go-around air carrier was told to turn right to avoid the departing aircraft
climbing on runway heading. Instead, he started to turn left. I told him to turn
right and he said he would take care of it himself. Then he turned right. Confusion
became apparent. If pilots would follow instructions, there would be a lot fewer
problems.
We were too high on approach and rather than pull out, we made a 360° turn. The
controller was very upset with us. We apparently conflicted with another aircraft.
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Air carrier was cleared for approach. Then I noted a radar target south of the local-
izer. I advised the pilot of his traffic. The pilot became abusive and then made an
unauthorized 360° turn into the aircraft on the localizer behind him. I told him to
turn immediately and climb. Instead he continued straight ahead and conflicted with
a third aircraft on downwind.
Throughout the reports of conflicts during the go-around, human factors remained obscure
or unmentioned. Only operational situations were cited as pertinent causes. Pilot sighting of traffic
was the usual means of conflict avoidance or evasion.
As we climbed out we saw a military jet pulling up from an approach to XYZ mili-
tary airport with our flightpaths converging. We turned away.
The tower was playing "Chicago-ORD" and rushing the operation. One aircraft was
still on his takeoff roll when we went around.
One aircraft was making a practice missed approach as the second aircraft entered
the pattern. We turned left. We missed the trainer by about 150 yards.
We contacted the tower by the OM and were advised we were overtaking traffic
ahead. We were told to climb out to 3,000 ft. The airport was VFR, but rain
showers in the area. At 1,800 ft we broke out in the clear to discover an air carrier
eastbound in our path at twelve o'clock.
Summary and Conclusions
A VFR go-around with all engines operating may be a "piece of cake" for the experienced
transport pilot. When viewed from the perspective of ASRS reports, however, pullouts from final
approach may have more serious implications.
"The big picture became apparent" reported one air carrier pilot as he initiated a precaution-
ary go-around and immediately heard the tower controller excitedly ("I'd hate to call it panic")
calling for a jet to abort his takeoff on the parallel runway.
Eighty percent of the go-arounds involving air carrier operations reported to the ASRS during
a 39-month period (mid-1976 to mid-1979) were conflict-avoidance maneuvers. Most of these
events took place in crowded TCA airspace. They usually were motivated by the sighting of another
aircraft on the landing runway. Converging traffic, resulting in abandoned approaches, invariably
was associated with airport runway layouts: parallel runways induced airman mixups in left/right
assignments; intersecting runways developed "dead ties" in the rollouts; and single runway opera-
tions frequently demonstrated an incompatibility of airspeed performance mix.
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Overall, 63% of the reported go-arounds charged to aircraft-on-the-runway situations and 40%
of all go-arounds reportedly due to merging traffic took place at TCA terminals. The classic three-
aircraft conflict equation, (1) an aircraft on takeoff or landing roll, (2) an aircraft holding in posi-
tion, (3) an aircraft on close-in final, was a prominent pattern at the busiest and most congested
airports.
Perhaps more significant than the conflict-generated go-around statistics was the finding that
32% of the reported climbouts transitioned immediately into subsequent conflicts. Furthermore,
these follow-on conflicts involved more serious near midair collision incidents than the initial,
often precautionary, avoidance maneuvers.
The analysis of these conflicts during the go-around phase suggested that two separate assump-
tions may be contributing causal factors in the conflict sequences: (1) work and habit conditioning
of ATC controllers to expect that air carriers will complete their landings during good weather
conditions, and (2) cockpit preplanning for execution of the published instrument missed-approach
procedure for a VMC go-around.
The unexpectedness of an air carrier's go-around, moving rapidly from approach airspace into
departure airspace, at times appeared to overload ATC coordination circuits for clearing a path
through the terminal area.
The standard, industry-wide practice of utilization of the ILS as the basic air carrier approach
procedure to be flown during any weather conditions almost mandates cockpit inclusion of the
published missed-approach information in approach briefing preplanning.
At the major airports, controller overriding priorities in separation of traffic or airman sighting
of a converging aircraft often intervened to prevent execution of the planned "miss." Parallel run-
way and intersecting runway operations were frequently associated with the ensuing conflicts.
The functional misfit of an all-IFR procedure employed during VMC terminal conditions was
exemplified in ASRS reports relating a pilot's belated recognition of a hazard during his initiation
or contemplated initiation of a go-around from a back-course ILS approach.
Parallel and intersecting runway layouts were associated physical factors both in the initial
go-around conflicts and in the subsequent during-go-around encounters. Thirty-four percent of all
TCA and TRSA airspace incidents referenced runway layouts.
Throughout the conflict reports, at all types of airports or airspace, were threaded the limita-
tions and fallibilities of airmen and controllers. The human factors identifiable in the go-around
incidents were various and diverse:
1. Distraction due to inexperienced first officer
2. Mistuning ILS frequency during pilot training activities




6. Controller's lack of knowledge of aircraft performance
7. Controller "on-the-job" training with "live" traffic
8. Airman's undue haste to comply with clearance for "immediate takeoff (thereby taking
clearance for another aircraft)
9. Airman delay in complying with clearance for "immediate takeoff
10. Controller expediting of traffic flow
11. Language barriers
12. Airman aggression to "beat" intersecting traffic




Traditionally, these reports have included a selection of Alert Bulletins, with the responses
offered to them by the appropriate addressees — for example, FAA, airport managers, and USAF.
Past selections have been subdivided into discrete classifications for the convenience of readers with
specific interests. This issue maintains the tradition, but deviates from the regular plan in offering a
group of AB's relating only to ATC facilities and procedures problems, as perceived by reporters to
ASRS. Incoming reports are assigned either "occurrence" or "situation" status. By the nature of
the system, Alert Bulletins nearly always point to situations, which presumably offer possibilities
for correction, rather than to occurrences, which cannot be addressed readily by the AB medium.
This 13th report presents a number of Alert Bulletins written to point out alleged problems in the
workings of the traffic control organization; this topic normally generates more bulletins than any
other subject, as might be expected. It is felt that the diversity of the bulletins may be instructive
in indicating the many varied and sometimes conflicting views that must be accommodated in
effecting the safe and efficient control of air traffic.
ATC: Facilities and Procedures
1. Text of AB: Tucson, AZ, Tucson International Airport. It is reported that the airport lay-
out, as well as the traffic volume and mix at TUS, creates a need for two local control positions in
the ATCT. The reporter notes that a second such position was established 2 years ago, but staff
complement constraints since then have dictated that the two positions be combined for much of
the time. The report contends that combining positions increases controller workload; the local
controller is required to monitor three frequencies, with consequent missed transmissions and mis-
understandings and frequent blocked transmissions. Pilots communicating with the tower on pub-
lished frequencies must often be switched to others. The reporter urges staffing for both of the two
local control positions.
Text of FAA response: No further action planned. Tucson International Tower is staffed at a
level very close to that authorized and adequately to perform authorized functions. Staffing is
comparable to other like facilities, with as much special consideration as resources of fully devel-
oped controllers will reasonably permit. An increase in authorizations is not warranted by current
traffic operations and configuration. The "three frequencies" in use are two VHF frequencies and a
UHF (military) frequency. One of the VHF frequencies is used for each of the two major runways/
traffic patterns when two local control positions are in use during peak periods. The use of multiple
frequencies is not unusual or unsafe. Proper assignment and use of the frequencies during other
periods should normally pose no inordinate problems.
2. Text of AB: Denver, CO, Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center. A pilot report notes
consistent difficulty in maintaining air/ground radio communication with Denver Center, the con-
trolling facility, at flight altitudes near MEA in the mountainous area between Fairfield (FFU),
Carbon (PUC), and Moab (OAB), and during approaches to airports within that area. Attempts to
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relay through other facilities are deemed impractical; reporter suggests installation of a remote com-
munication (RCAG) facility in the affected sector of Denver Center.
Text of FAA response: Fringe area coverage difficulties will be experienced at the lower alti-
tudes in the area described due to high terrain.
Construction of a new RCAG site for the Salt Lake ARTCC (Sunnyside, Utah) will start this
summer. Commissioning is anticipated in late CY-79 or early CY-80. A follow-on program is
planned to provide an additional channel, from Sunnyside, to the Denver Center sometime in late
CY-80. Engineering studies indicate the Sunnyside site should resolve the problems outlined above.
3. Text of AB: Louisville, KY, Standiford Airport. Controller reports that the interior lighting
in Standiford Tower is inadequate in intensity and direction, and that because of this it is difficult
for controllers to operate equipment, make entries, and read written material. Reporter contends
that the lighting deficiency causes delays in clearances and amendments and could lead to commis-
sion of hazardous errors. He recommends installation of small lamps in appropriate locations to
alleviate the situation.
Text of FAA response: The subject lighting problem proved difficult to determine with the
limited information contained in the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Alert Bulletin.
The only possible source of a lighting problem appears to be that the FDEP position is
installed approximately 12 inches off-center of the cab ceiling light. The local Airway Facilities
personnel are presently adjusting the aiming angle of the light to obtain a direct beam on the posi-
tion. This is expected to eliminate the problem.
It appears that no national application will be involved.
4. Text of AB: Hampton, GA, Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center. Controller reports
that on relocation of the Martin Lake Sector operating position within the Atlanta Center several
months ago, the Backup Emergency Communication (BUEC) equipment was left in its previous
location, about 50 ft from the sector normal position. Loss of a frequency in the primary equip-
ment, which dictates immediate activation of the BUEC equipment, requires that the sector control-
ler involved seek aid from a disengaged controller or supervisor or, failing that, leave his position in
order to activate the backup gear. Reporter feels that ready accessibility of emergency equipment
is an urgent requirement and that relocation of the equipment, which would not be costly in time
or money, would eliminate the possibility of a potentially disruptive and hazardous occurrence.
Text of FAA Response: The subject bulletin refers to a situation whereby the Backup Emer-
gency Communication (BUEC) selector panels were left in a location 50 ft from where they were
needed. On May 26, 1979, the panels were moved to the position of operation where needed, thus
correcting the problem. No further action is required.
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5. Text of AB: Oklahoma City, OK, Tinker RAPCON. Two controller reports describe con-
tinuing malfunction and unreliable operation of the ARTS III radar equipment in the Tinker
RAPCON, serving the Oklahoma City area. Among the problems cited are periodic complete equip-
ment failure, excessive target coasting, and noncorrespondence of ARTS III targets with actual
targets. Reporter considers the situation hazardous to air traffic.
Text of FAA response: The high failure rate of printed circuit cards in the Automated Radar
Terminal System (ARTS III) at Tinker RAPCON (21 cards during the period October 1978
through March 1979) was attributed to inadequate cooling in the equipment room. New air condi-
tioning ducts and a humidifier have been installed, and no failures have occurred since March 1979.
Target coasting and noncorrespondence of radar and beacon targets was resolved by replace-
ment of a rotary joint, azimuth switch printed circuit card and realignment of the azimuth pulse
generator unit. These actions were completed on March 30 and no recurrence of this problem has
been reported.
The Tinker RAPCON ARTS III system is operational and no outages have occurred since
March 1979.
6. Text of AB: Various Air Traffic Control Facilities. Reporting controller alleges personal
observation of television receivers operating in control tower cabs and radar rooms with tacit
approval of facility supervision and management and, at times, with visitors present. Reporter con-
tends that attention of controllers is often diverted from their primary duties while they watch
sporting and other events and that the distraction caused by this is highly detrimental to the safety
of air traffic. He points out that this type of activity is contrary to regulations and recommends
that measures be taken to ensure that television viewing be restricted in traffic control facilities to
off-duty times and nonoperational spaces.
Text of FAA response: We do not believe there is a need to specifically single out the particu-
lar alleged situation in this report in the form of a directive. The Air Traffic Facility chief is respon-
sible for proper management of the facility. That responsibility includes assuring that nonjob-
related activities will not interfere with the primary task of the facility. If the allegations are true,
the facility chief is not properly managing his facility. Accordingly, we plan to forward this alert
bulletin along with a letter reminding facility managers of their responsibility.
7. Text of AB: Miami, FL, Miami International Airport. A controller reports that radio trans-
mission on frequency 119.7 MHz is subject to frequent failure. Citing one recent incident involving
several aircraft within the Miami TRACON area of responsibility, the backup emergency equipment
also malfunctioned on the same frequency, forcing a controller to relay air traffic control instruc-
tions through an air carrier aircraft using a different frequency. Reporter contends that a serious
hazard to air traffic will exist until improved radio equipment is installed in the TRACON.
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Text of FAA response: Frequency 119.7 is a remote frequency located at Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. It is used as a departure and Stage III service frequency for traffic operating north of
Fort Lauderdale International Airport.
In an attempt to solve the chronic problems associated with frequency 119.7, TELCO has
ceased microwaving this frequency between Fort Lauderdale and Miami and has converted to high-
quality landline transference. Additionally, the following improvements have also been made:
1. A new receiver antenna has been installed.
2. Solid-state equipment has been installed.
3. A new emergency multichannel tranceiver has been installed.
4. A new main/standby selector panel with indicator lights has been installed.
The last reported outage on 119.7 was June 8, 1979. Frequency 119.7 is more reliable than
before the improvements were made.
8. Text of AB: Knoxville, TN, McGhee Tyson Airport. A pilot reporter describes a recent
landing at McGhee Tyson Airport during which, as his aircraft topped a rise in the runway, he
sighted men and equipment at work on the runway ahead; he aborted the landing, executed a
go-around, and landed safely after observing from altitude that the men and equipment were work-
ing in the final 3,000 ft of runway which had been noted in the current ATIS broadcast as "closed."
The ATIS message had included the information that 6,500 ft of runway was usable but neither the
ATIS nor the tower controller had mentioned that men and equipment were on the runway. Com-
bination of afternoon sun in his face, visual distortion caused by heat waves rising from the concrete
surface, runway rise, and surprise induced in the pilot the impression that the aircraft was much
closer to the men and equipment than was actually the case. He recommends that flightcrews be
advised whenever men and equipment are on, or close to, runways, even though information on
length restriction may have been given.
Text of FAA response: FAA Handbook 7110.65A, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 901.a
requires controllers to describe vehicles, persons, or equipment in a manner "which will assist pilots
in recognizing them." Since the alert bulletin did not include a specific time/date reference and was
received after normal record retention time for the date of the bulletin (May 31), we were unable to
substantiate the specifics.
Airport construction was in progress; a portion of runway 22R was closed; and the threshold
was displaced approximately as stated in the bulletin.
Information concerning available landing and departure length was contained in the ATIS
broadcast, and the information was disseminated via the NOT AM system. The information provided
should also have created pilot "awareness" that the construction in progress could include people
and equipment in the construction area.
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Prior to and during the time of construction, numerous controller briefings were held concern-
ing airport construction and its impact on users. The provisions of paragraph 901.a of Handbook
7110.65A were included in these briefings.
We were unable to determine whether the provisions of paragraph 901.a were actually fol-
lowed at all times during this incident. However, the facility management is aware of the need to
emphasize to all controllers the need for compliance with paragraph 901.a of Handbook 7110.65A.
9. Text of AB: Johnstown, PA, Johnstown-Cambria County Airport. A recent pilot report
describes a landing at Johnstown during which air-ground communication could not be established.
Reporter mentions a postlanding visit to the Flight Service Station on the field; the Detroit Sec-
tional Chart depicts 123.6 MHz as a Johnstown communication frequency. The current Airport/
Facility Directory (Northeast U.S.) omits any listing of that communication frequency or of a
Flight Service Station at Johnstown.
Text of FAA response: The current issue of the Airport/Facility Directory (Northeast U.S.),
dated 14 June 1979 on page 125, under Johnstown, Cambria Co., does not list Johnstown FSS in
the normal manner. It does however list under COMM/NAVAID REMARKS: Johnstown FSS pro-
vides AAS 1130-0430z daily on frequency 123.6. The next issue of the Airport/Facility Directory
effective 9 August will publish the information in the proper format.
We cannot determine why radio communication could not be established with the appropriate
FSS.
10. Text of AB: Washington, D.C., Washington National Airport. A controller reports that
radio communication effectiveness in DCA Tower has been severely hampered for several months
by frequent bursts of interference on the air-traffic-control frequencies. The periods of interference
may last as long as 2 min; during these periods, air-ground transmissions become unintelligible and
aircraft departures have, of necessity, been delayed because of the inability of controllers to com-
municate with departing aircraft. Reporter states that alleviation attempts have been unsuccessful
and feels that the problem is affecting aviation safety adversely in the congested Washington area.
He recommends that urgent measures be taken to eliminate the interference.
Text of FAA response: Considerable effort has been expended by our Eastern Region and a
variety of problems have been identified and corrected. It is now believed that the problem has
been solved. Factors contributing to the problem are as follows:
1. Ignition noise from vehicles operating on the airport
2. Faulty rotary joint on ASR-8
3. Airline computer radiation
4. Faulty splices on Telco lines
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11. Text of AB: Louisville, KY, Standiford Field Airport. Two controller reports deal with
loss of primary radio transmitting/receiving capability in Standiford Tower, allegedly as a result of
maintenance activity not coordinated with the working controllers. According to reporter, the
emergency backup transceiver is located above the console in a position requiring the controller to
stand on a chair and hold a flashlight in order to reach and use its controls. The reports strongly
suggest a need for a more modern backup communication system at this facility.
Text of FAA response: The subject bulletin refers to an incident whereby the primary com-
munications was lost and the emergency transceiver was in an awkward location to use at Louisville,
Kentucky, Standiford Field. This situation was discussed between local Airway Facilities and Air
Traffic personnel. A review of facility AT logs failed to disclose any communications outage which
could be attributed to the situation described in the bulletin. However, Local Airway Facilities
personnel will work with Air Traffic personnel to move the emergency transceiver wherever it is
the most convenient.
12. Text of AB: Roswell, NM, Roswell Industrial Air Center. Reporter notes that the official
closing time of Roswell Tower coincides closely with the regular nightly arrival and departure times
of four flights, and that there are frequent occasions when additional traffic is also present. He
states that arrival aircraft are not always visible to FSS personnel and feels that hours of tower
operation should be revised or extended to eliminate the potential hazard presented by the increas-
ing amount of uncontrolled traffic.
Text of FAA response: The Roswell Industrial Air Center Airport Traffic Control Tower closes
at 10 p.m. One ZIA Airlines flight is scheduled to arrive at 9:40 p.m. and an Air Midwest flight
arrives at 10:50 p.m. Each flight normally departs about 15 min after arrival.
The number of aircraft using the airport at any one time after 10 p.m. is far below a level that
requires the services of a control tower to ensure a safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of traffic.
Concerning safety, our experience with other part-time and nontower airports indicates that
pilots operate safely without control towers during low density traffic periods. Of 428 control
towers we operate, 220 are part-time facilities. Many of these are comparable to, or busier than,
the Roswell facility, and several do not have flight service stations (FSS) on the airport.
However, the control tower is only part of the system that provides air traffic services to flight
operations in the Roswell area. All air traffic services essential to 24-hour operation of the airport
are continued. Albuquerque Center provides approach control services (separation of IFR aircraft)
24 hours daily. Roswell FSS remains in operation to provide airport communications, weather
observations, flight plan processing, airport advisories, and other functions. The same separation of
aircraft operating under instrument flight rules in the terminal area will continue. Aircraft operating
under visual flight rules will continue to operate visually in accordance with standard rules, regu-
lations, and procedures; i.e., "see-and-avoid."
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13. Text of AB: Pasco, WA, Tri-Cities Airport. Pilot report alleges that ground and local con-
trol positions at Tri-Cities Tower are combined much of the time, with one controller performing
both ground and local control functions. According to reporter, it is customary at the facility to
operate both ground and local frequencies with continuously open microphones, with the result
that all air traffic control information is transmitted simultaneously on both frequencies. Since
pilots monitor only one of the frequencies, depending on the phase of flight, considerable confusion
exists and leads to overlapping transmissions and frequent message blocking. Reporter recommends
that each of the two control frequencies be reserved for communication of its particular function in
the interest of increased safety.
Text of FAA response: An evaluation was conducted concerning simultaneous use of ground
control and local control transmitters in lieu of selecting a single transmitter.
The practice of selecting/deselecting so as to transmit on a single frequency at a time while
positions of operation are combined is time-consuming, cumbersome and, more importantly, could
have an effect on safety. If the incorrect frequency were selected when an imminent situation pre-
sented itself — one requiring split-second response - the results could create an unsafe condition.
Because of his/her duties, the local controller is sometimes a distance away from the transceivers
and does not have immediate access to frequency selector keys.
The statement that transmitting on two frequencies is unsafe because an individual can only
hear one side of the conversation is, in our opinion, questionable. Many facilities transmit simul-
taneously on UHF/VHF while working a mix of traffic. Many times, pilots hear dual-frequency
transmissions and, to the best of our knowledge, this has not presented a threat to safety. However,
controllers should avoid the indiscriminate use of simultaneous frequency transmissions.
Good controller judgment should dictate whether or not simultaneous transmissions are
necessary.
14. Text of AB: Memphis, TN, Memphis International Airport. Reporting pilot notes that at
MEM, arrival ATIS information is broadcast on frequency 121.0 MHz, departure ATIS utilizes fre-
quency 119.45 MHz. In normal practice, arriving pilots attempt receipt of the arrival information
at considerable distance from the airport, before commencing descent, in order to decrease the
workload in the lower altitude terminal environment. According to reporter, 121.0 MHz is subject
to severe interference under these conditions as a result of other tower and clearance delivery trans-
missions on the same frequency within reception range, requiring repeated attempts to understand
the ATIS data over the interference. Conversely, frequency 119.45 MHz, used for MEM departure
data, which is normally used only on the ground at short range, is not subject to interference from
other transmissions. Reporter suggests that message clarity would be greatly improved, cockpit
workload lessened, and accurate receipt of data increased through reversing of the two MEM ATIS
frequencies to provide arrival information on 119.45 MHz and departure information on
121.0MHz.
Text of FAA response: Investigation of the subject report indicates it was probably filed by a
jet pilot inbound to Memphis from the east. Although only one report of a similar nature has been
48
received by Memphis ATC Tower, the potential exists to receive Atlanta Approach Control north
satellite sector on 121.0 MHz when at high altitude and well east of Memphis.
While we recognize the users' desire to obtain ATIS information as early as possible, they
should not expect clear communications beyond the protected area. ATIS frequencies are protected
for a maximum of 50 miles for arrival ATIS and 20 miles for departure ATIS. A project to relocate
ATIS frequencies to a special frequency spectrum is under way at this time. The proposed fre-
quency range would be above 121.0 MHz and, therefore, resolve this specific complaint.
We do not plan to change the Memphis International Airport ATIS frequencies at this time due
to the ongoing project and lack of assurance from frequency management that 119.45 MHz would
be any less susceptible to interference than 121.0 MHz if used beyond the protected area.
15. Text of AB: Los Angeles, CA, Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center; Las Vegas,
NV, Las Vegas TRACON. Controller reports allege that provisions of a Letter of Agreement
between Los Angeles Center and Las Vegas TRACON intended to ensure separation between air-
craft departing Las Vegas are not being observed; as a consequence: aircraft departing in-trail are
handed off to Los Angeles Center with inadequate separation existing or imminent. Reports cite
instances of speed differentials, contending that at time of hand-off, the second aircraft was in an
overtaking condition. Reporters feel that it is the TRACON's responsibility to ensure separation,
rather than to expect the Center to institute corrective measures on short notice.
Text of FAA response: This situation was first brought to the attention of the Los Angeles
Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) Area Officer on January 15, 1979. It was subsequently
discussed with the Las Vegas Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) Operations Officer on February 7,
1979. As a result of this discussion, Las Vegas ATCT provided an operational briefing to all air
traffic control personnel emphasizing the need to ensure 5 miles in-trail separation between succes-
sive aircraft being handed off to Los Angeles ARTCC. These briefings were conducted the week of
February 11, 1979.
To further clarify the 5-mile in-trail requirement, the Terminal Control Area Letter of Agree-
ment was revised as follows: "The minimum separation between all aircraft being handed off
between Los Angeles Center and Las Vegas Tower shall be 5 miles in-trail and remain constant or
increase." This revised agreement was included in a Las Vegas ATCT operational briefing conducted
the week of March 12, 1979, and became effective March 14, 1979.
The subject was again discussed by the Los Angeles ARTCC Area Officer and a Facility Air
Traffic Technical Advisory Committee (FATTAC) representative at the Las Vegas ATCT on
July 11 and 12, 1979. As a result of these discussions, Las Vegas ATCT agreed to reemphasize the
handoff requirements per the letter of agreement. This was accomplished by an all personnel memo
dated July 24, 1979 subject: Acceptance Parameter Reference ZLA Handoff/Use of Visual Separa-
tion. The Terminal Control Area Letter of Agreement was again included in an operational briefing
conducted during the weeks of August 13, 1979, and September 4, 1979.
In conclusion, we are aware of no instances of nonadherence to this particular procedure
since July 13, 1979.
* * *
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16. Text of AB: Des Moines, IA, Des Moines Municipal Airport — Des Moines TRACON.
Controller reports that despite repeated log entries and at least one UCR the ATC Radar Beacon
System at Des Moines has been unreliable for a considerable period of time. According to reporter,
beacon returns on the radarscope coast, do not interrogate, and jump. Boosting of gain to improve
weak returns results in "ring around." The situation is considered hazardous to air traffic and
reporter recommends a concentrated effort to locate the basic faults, followed by required remedial
action.
Text of FAA response: The subject report pertains to missing beacon targets which are the
result of holes existing in the beacon coverage pattern. These holes are generated by rf energy from
the beacon "hog trough" antenna being reflected in a lobing manner from the ground.
The new 5-foot open array beacon antenna was installed at the Des Moines facility on
October 16, and a significant reduction in missing targets was achieved. This appears to have cor-
rected the reported problem. The region will continue to monitor the beacon system at this facility
and perform any required changes to the antenna tilt and transmitter/receiver adjustments to opti-
mize the performance.
17. Text of AB: San Juan, PR, Puerto Rico International Airport, and Isla Grande Airport.
Reporter, calling attention to the large number of pilots without native English fluency operating in
the San Juan area, suggests that confusion and potentially hazardous situations could be reduced if
ground/air radio transmissions were to be made with slower delivery speeds and with careful enun-
ciation. Reporter contends that rapid and poorly enunciated ATC communications and ATIS
broadcasts often aggravate critical situations for pilots and crewmembers in this area who are accus-
tomed to speaking a language other than English; such pilots and crewmembers frequently experi-
ence difficulty in properly understanding the full intent of the messages transmitted.
Text of FAA response: The FAA Southern Region Air Traffic Division has recommended a
program be instituted in the San Juan area to brief all controllers on the need for slower speech
rates and more precise pronunciation and enunciation. They have provided San Juan offices/
facilities with a copy of the ASRS Bulletin for background explanatory information. The regional
Flight Standards staff has been provided a copy of the bulletin for appropriate action in the area
of user competency in this regard.
18. Text of AB: Kaunakakai, HI, Molokai Airport. Reports describe difficulties in safely con-
trolling air traffic at Molokai Airport because of the deficiencies of the control tower in use.
According to reporters, the tower is a mobile type which, due to its design and construction, and
to its location on the airport, does not permit full vision of the airport operating areas. An incident
of lost separation in the traffic pattern is cited as an example of the controllers' inability to
observe the traffic. In addition to the visibility obstruction attributable to the tower design and
location, it is subject to morning and afternoon glare and reflection problems which add to the
allegedly hazardous condition.
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Text of FAA response: Investigation of the subject report indicates that the air traffic control
service provided by Molokai Tower is safe and efficient.
The present structure, though mobile in design, is permanently located on the roof of the air-
port fire station, allowing controllers full vision of the airport movement area.
We are not aware of any air traffic incidents at Molokai that can be attributed to the control-
ler's inability to observe traffic.
Morning, afternoon, and evening glare/reflection 'problems and finding methods of minimizing
their effect are ongoing concerns at all control towers. Tower shades were installed at Molokai in
late September 1979. We are not satisfied with the working conditions in the present tower and
have taken action to correct the situation.
A project to relocate Molokai Tower has been included in our budgetary planning. However, it
must be kept in mind that this item has to compete for priority with all other National Airspace
System requirements on a regional as well as national basis. Our facilities and equipment funds are
limited and consideration of a project does not ensure inclusion in a specific budget.
19. Text of AB: Manhattan, KS, Manhattan Municipal Airport. Reporting pilot questions the
policy under which he is instructed by Kansas City Center to communicate with Marshall AAF
Tower while descending inbound to nearby Manhattan. Reporter contends that applicable regula-
tions do not require this contact while his aircraft is outside and above Marshall ATA and that in
complying with the instruction, his attention is diverted by lengthy weather and airport information
at Marshall at a time when prudence dictates that he should be in communication with Manhattan
FSS. The pilot cites a recent instance in which he was actually in the Manhattan traffic pattern and
unable to obtain critical and timely traffic information needed, because of the required monitoring
of the irrelevant Marshall transmission.
Text of FAA response: The facilities involved have revised procedures to more effectively
accommodate the Manhattan arrivals that penetrate the Marshall AAF Airport Traffic Area. •
The intent of the communications transfer to Marshall AAF Tower was to allow the pilot to
meet the provision of FAR 91.85(b) which states, "Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC
no person may operate an aircraft within an airport traffic area," and FAR 91.87(b) which states,
"no person may, within an airport traffic area, operate an aircraft to, from, or on an airport having
a control tower operated by the United States unless two-way radio communications are maintained
between the aircraft and the control tower."
If the pilot was aware of a condition unknown to ATC (in this instance the aircraft would not
penetrate the Marshall AAF Airport Traffic Area en route to Manhattan Municipal) and in the
pilot's opinion remaining on Marshall AAF Tower frequency would place the aircraft in jeopardy, it
is the pilot's responsibility to request an amended clearance.
51
20. Text of AB: Portland, OR, Portland TRACON. It has been reported that no standardized
procedures exist for the sequencing of arrival and departure air traffic using runway 20 at PDX.
This runway is frequently active when severe weather conditions occur and the lack of standard
procedures places methods for handling traffic on individual controller discretion. Reporter con-
tends that agreements should be reached with Seattle Center to ensure an orderly flow to the single
runway, replacing the present procedure of giving responsibility to the TRACON to adjust speed,
descent, vectors, and trail interval of arriving-and departing aircraft. Reporter recommends that
specific directives be implemented to ensure safe and standardized handling of this traffic.
Text of FAA response: The reported deficiencies noted in Alert Bulletin 80:9 have been inves-
tigated. There was some validity and merit to the reported deficiencies and recommendation.
Portland Tower was aware of the need for standardized procedures for a runway 20 flow; however,
due to the infrequent use of runway 20 — less than one percent utilization — development and
implementation were delayed by higher-priority endeavors.
Initial development began in August 1979, to establish airspace alignment and procedures for
a runway 20 operation. All automation, airspace alignment, and video map requirements were com-
pleted in January 1980. The facility directive is in print and team briefings concluded on March 7,
1980. Runway 20 procedures will become effective on March 13, 1980.
We are confident that the directive being implemented by Portland Tower will provide stan-
dardized procedures for handling a runway 20 operation.
21. Text of AB: Los Angeles, CA, Los Angeles International Airport. Reporting pilot, citing a
recent profile descent to LAX during which it was alleged by ATC that he ^deviated from the
charted procedure at the 21 DME fix by continuing descent on the glide slope instead of maintain-
ing 7,000 ft, contends that the profile descent chart directs a 7,000-ft crossing altitude at this point
but omits mention of "maintain," and that normal procedure would sanction the continuing
descent. Reporter recommends standardization of profile descent chart terminology, pointing out
that charts for other airports include "maintain" under circumstances not unlike those cited; he
considers the chart terminology differences from one airport to another conducive to confusion for
pilots and controllers alike.
Text of FAA response: The altitude restrictions for Baset and Royal intersections on the
Los Angeles Runways 24/25 Profile Descent Chart were revised (3/2/80) to read, "cross at and
maintain 7,000."
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035, December 5, 1980
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